Bowers v. Hardwick by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1985
Bowers v. Hardwick
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bowers v. Hardwick. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 129. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Virginia.
Court ................... . l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 
85-140 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GEORGIA, Petitioner 
VB. 




MERITS MOTION HOLD 
FOR 
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
Burger, Ch. J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 
Brennan, J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : ) 
White, J ...................... V. . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
/ ................ . 
Blackmun, J ................. . e ::::::::: :::::: 
Powell, J ............................................ . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V .. / . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
Stevens, J ......................... Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . 
ABSENT NOT YOTING 
v. 
Hardwic•~ 6 C 
(enga egal, 
consensual sex acts) Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge CAll's conclusion that Ga.'s 
sodomy statute implicates a fundamental right of a homosexual to 
engage in private sexual activity with another consenting adult, 
and CAll's holding that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the 
(;{2A NT ~~ r('-H...t_ Cav.r-1 wi$~~ iv dL~cL._ ~c..~.Je. ~ +lu.. frD~rai i<>~c.u. 
(~~ ~u~1 afts~~~'J . O~w-i!L1 bf_N'1 . . -~- &1\ (~u.Mj~&a.<-k~.) 
City of Richmond, 425 u.s. 901 (1976), summarily aff'g, 403 
F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) did not prevent CAll from reaching 
the merits. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: A Ga. sodomy statute makes 
it illegal to engage in oral or anal sex, and carries a penalty 
of from one to 20 years in prison. O.C.G.A. §16-6-2. Resp Hard-
wick, a 29-year-old homosexual, was arrested for committing this 
crime with a consenting male adult in the bedroom of Hardwick's 
home. Charges were filed against Hardwick and after a hearing in 
Municipal Court, he was bound over to the Superior Court. The 
DA's office then declined to present the case to a grand jury 
unless additional evidence developed. 
Hardwick and a married couple, John and Mary Doe, (all three 
are resps here) filed a declaratory judgment action in DC seeking 
to have the statute declared unconstitutional. Hardwick alleged 
in the complaint that he regularly engages in homosexual acts and 
will continue to do so. The Does alleged that they wanted to 
engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute, but had been 
chilled and deterred by the statute and Hardwick's arrest. The 
defendants, who include petr, filed a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim. The DC (ND Ga. Hall, J.) dismissed the 
case on the authority of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the 
City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily aff'g, 403 
F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), in which the Court affirmed a 
three-judge DC dec is ion upholding the const i tut ionali ty of a 
Virginia statute that prohibited consensual homosexual inter-
course between adults in private. 
CAll reversed. Standing: Hardwick had standing because 
there was a real and immediate threat of prosecution. Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 u.s. 452, 459 (1974). The State's past enforcement 
of the statute against him raises a strong inference that the 
state intends to prosecute him in the future. Hardwick contends 
that his homosexual lifestyle will lead him to violate the stat-
ute regardless of its legality. And Hardwick is well suited to 
challenge the law. Therefore, even if the State is not threaten-
ing to enforce the law, the existence of the statute provides a 
sufficient basis on which to confer standing. See Babbitt v. 
United Farm Workers National Union, 442 u.s. 289, 302-03 (1979). 
The Does did not have standing. In the DC, the Does relied 
on the existence of the statute, its literal application to their 
situation, and the State's refusal to promise not to prosecute. 
~ Before the appeal to CAll they did not request discovery or an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a threat of 
future prosecution. Younger v. Harris, 401 u.s. 37, 40-42 
(1971). 
Judge Kravitch concurred on the standing issue. 
Summary affirmance: The summary affirmance in Doe does not 
control this case. A summary affirmance has binding precedential 
effect, but represents approval of the judgment below and not the 
reasoning. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 u.s. 173 (1975). The scope of 
a summary affirmance is determined by examining the issues neces-
sarily decided in reaching the result and the issues mentioned in 
the jurisdictional statement. Illinois State Board of Elections 
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 u.s. 173, 181-83 (1979). In Doe, 
the two indicia conflict. The juri sd ict ional sta ternent asked 
whether Virginia's sodomy statute violated constitutional rights 
to privacy, due process and equal protection under the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. But a narrower 
ground was available: the plaintiffs in Doe clearly lacked 
standing because they had neither been arrested nor presented any 
evidence of threatened or past prosecutions under the statute. A 
lower court should presume that the case was decided on the nar-
rower ground. Otherwise, litigants would have too much controJ 
over the scope of summary dispositions. 
The fact that the Court in Doe affirmed the dismissal on the 
merits does not demonstrate that the Court reached the merits of 
the case. Although an appellate court that finds a lack of 
standing normally vacates the judgment with instructions to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has not 
uniformly followed that course. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 u.s. 362 
(1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 u.s. 488 (1974). There is less 
reason to vacate with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject 
rna t ter juri sd ict ion if the case presents prudential standing 
problems--as Doe appeared to--which do not bear on the power of a 
court to hear the case. 
Similarly, the Court was not required to dismiss for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction over a three-judge court. Appellate ju-
risdiction is conferred only when the three-judge court is prop-
erly convened. 28 u.s.c. §1253. When a three-judge court dis-
misses a case due to a plaintiff's lack of constitutional stand-
ing, the Court will often dismiss an appeal and vacate the judg-
ment below. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 
u.s. 90 (1974). But the Court has not held that it lacks juris-
diction over an appeal from a dismissal by a three-judge court 
where the plaintiff lacks standing. A three-judge court may be 
properly convened when it could decide the case on nonconstitu-
tional grounds. Alexander v. Fioto, 430 u.s. 634 (1977). There-
fore, if there was a prudential standing problem, the Court could 
affirm a dismissal by a three-judge court. 
Judge Kravitch dissented, finding that Doe governed this 
case. A summary affirmance is a decision on the merits of a 
case. Hicks v. Miranda, 442 u.s. 332, 344 (1975). The jurisdic-
tional statement, which limits the range of permissible lower 
court interpretations of a summary disposition, mentioned the 
substantive contitutional issues in the case but did not mention 
the issue of standing. Most important, if the plaintiffs in Doe 
lacked standing, the Court would not have had juri sd ict ion to 
decide the case. The Court would have had to dismiss the appeal 
instead of summarily affirming the lower court, which had decided 
the case on the merits. This would have been the case whether 
the lack of standing was on constitutional or prudential grounds. 
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 509 (1961). 
Judge Kravitch conceded that the Court does not always va-
cate the judgment and remand for dismissal when it finds that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing. But the crucial issue is whether the 
Court could have summarily affirmed the lower court in Doe on the 
basis of lack of standing, or whether dismissal of the appeal 
would have been required. In Rizzo and O'Shea, the cases cited 
by the majority, the Court reversed a lower court decision ren-
dered on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court cites 
no case in which the Court has affirmed, on the basis of lack of 
standing, a lower court decision rendered on the merits in favor 
of the defendants. 
The majority said that even if Doe had resolved the merits, 
later cases indicate that the Court views the constitutional 
question as open. In Carey v. Population Services, 431 u.s. 678, 
688 n. 5 (1977), the Court stated that it was not reaching the 
quest ion of ~h_{(c~-~r and to what extent the Canst i tut ion prohibits 
state statutes regulating private consensual sexual behavior 
among adults. A dissent criticized that language as conflicting 
with Doe. The Court also indicated that the constitutionality of 
a state law prohibiting consensual sodomy had been raised in New 
York v. Uplinger, cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 64 (1983), dismissed 
as improvidently granted, 104 s.ct. 2332 (1984). 
Judge Kravitch did not think the question was open. Carey 
simply acknowledges that the Court has not yet passed on the 
validity of many kinds of state statutes regulating sexual con-
duct. It does not purport to overrule cases such as Doe. The 
majority also infers too much from the dismissal of the writ of 
cert in Uplinger. 
Merits: The Court's right of privacy cases prohibit state 
interference with certain decisions critical to personal autono-
my. The Court has indicated that the intimate associations pro-
tected by the Constitution are not limited to those with a pro-
creative purpose. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 
(1965) (striking down state law prohibiting the use of contracep-
tives because it interfered with sanctity of marriage relation-
ship): Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 u.s. 374, 385-86 (1978) (listing 
"associational interests" and procreation as separate interests 
protected by the right to marry) . The intimate associations 
protected against state interference extend beyond the marriage 
relationship. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 u.s. 438 (1972) (pro-
hibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons 
unconstitutional because 
differently) • "For some, 
treats married and unmarried persons 
the sexual activity in question here 
serves the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage," CAll said. 
In addition, having privacy in one's home covers some activ-
ities that would not normally merit constitutional protect ion. 
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980): Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 u.s. 557 (1969) (unconstitutional to criminalize the 
possession of obscene films in one's home). Hardwick presents an 
interest at least as substantial to that in Stanley, and one that 
presents no public ramifications. 
CAll found that the statute implicated a fundamental right 
protected by the Ninth Amendment and by substantive due process. 
Accordingly, CAll remanded the case for trial, at which time the 
State must prove a compelling interest in regulating this behav-
ior and a narrowly drawn statute. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that CAll's decision con-
flicts with the CADC's opinion in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 
1388, 1392, reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (CADC 1984), which found 
that Doe was binding on the lower courts as a decision on the 
- 0 -
merits. Dronenberg also held that the Court's privacy cases do 
not cover a right to engage in homosexual conduct. Id., at 1395-
96. 
Decisions related purely to sexual gratification have been 
regulated by government throughout the history of Western civili-
zation. By contrast, the Court said in Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 
113, 140 (1973), that at the time the Constitution was adopted, a 
woman had a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy 
than she did in 1973. But no similar right to engage in sodomy 
existed or was contemplated when the Constitution was adopted. 
Therefore, sodomy of any kind, including that which takes place 
in private, cannot be considered a fundamental right or implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty. 
The Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 u.s. 49 
(1973) permitted States to make unprovable assumptions lacking in 
scientifically certain criteria in order to protect a social 
interest in order and morality. CAll's opinion will impede the 
States' ability to legislate in any area touching upon moral 
issues, and calls into question statutes proscribing such person-
al conduct as suicide, prostitution, polygamy, adultery, fornica-
tion, and the private possession and use of illegal drugs. 
Resps largely adopt CAll's arguments in contending that Doe 
does not constitute binding precedent. This Court employed simi-
lar reasoning in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
462 U.S. 416 (1983) in discussing the precedential effects of a 
summary affirmance. Other circuits have interpreted Doe similar-
ly, see Rich v. Sec'y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 n. 8 (CAlO 
1984); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 (CA9 1980); as 
have the highest courts of New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. 
In addition, Doe did not address any claim of a First Amendment 
right of association, which is involved here. 
The Court should not grant cert. CAll did not hold the 
statute unconstitutional. Rather, it stated an appropriate con-
stitutional test in the abstract and remanded the case for trial. 
Accordingly, review by this Court is premature. The State virtu-
ally concedes the case is premature by filing a petn for cert 
rather than an appeal pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §12S4(2) from a deci-
sion holding a state statute unconstitutional. 
The prematurity of the case precludes it from conflicting 
with any other Circuit. Moreover, Dronenburg was a military 
case, and its discussion of Doe was dicta. At issue there was 
the constitutionality of a naval discharge regulation, and not 
the military sodomy law. The case indicated that the standard by 
which military regulations must be judged is much lower than in a 
civilian context. Dronenburg v. Zech, supra, at 1392. In addi-
tion, there is no ripe conflict between this case and CAS's deci-
sion in Baker v. Wade, slip op. No. 82-1S90 (CAS August 26, 198S) 
(en bane). Baker, like this case, involved a declaratory judg-
ment challenge to the constitutionality of a state sodomy law, 
and CAS reversed the DC's holding that the law was unconstitu-
tional. Baker v. Wade, SS3 F.Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). Since 
the issues here are not framed concretely yet, there is no con-
flict with Baker. 
' . 
On the merits, resps' argument is similar to CAll's opinion. 
Affirming CAll will not wreak havoc on the States. Twenty-two 
States have deer iminali zed private homosexual acts, and the 
courts in two other States have struck down sodomy statutes. 
States will still be able to prohibit suicide, drug abuse, pros-
titution, and bigamy. 
4. DISCUSSION: ~here is no bar to granting cert in a case 
where a CA has disposed of an appeal from a final judgment in a 
way that requires further action in the DC. See, e.g., Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97, 98 (1976) (CA reversed DC's dismissal of 
§1983 complaint and remanded with instructions to reinstate com-
plaint; Court granted cert over dissent stating that Court's 
normal practice is to deny interlocutory review, id., at 114); 
Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s. 478, 480-481 (1978) (DC dismissed 
action on ground of absolute immunity; CA reversed, finding offi-
cials entitled to qualified immunity). Although the Court has at 
times suggested that such a CA ruling must be "fundamental to the 
further conduct of the case," that standard is arguably met by 
any CA reversal of a final judgment that requires further pro-
ceedings, See 17 Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure §4036, at 23-24 (1978), and is met in this case. On 
the other hand, the Court has also denied cert on the grounds 
that the case is not ripe for review. See e.g., Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & A.R. Co., 389 u.s. 
327, 328 (1967) ("because the Court of Appeals remanded the case, 
it is not yet ripe for review by this Court"); Hamilton-Brown 




finality "funi shed su ff ic ient ground for the denial") . These 
cases thus could support a decision either way. 
Hardwick appears to have standing, so that would be no bar 
to taking the case either, even though the Does will probably 
drop out for lack of standing. 
The debate between the CAll majority and dissent about the 
L-- ...... --"""? 
summary affirmance standards does not control this Court's deci-
sion on whether to reconsider the issue in Doe. Summary deci-
sions carry less authority in this Court than do opinions ren-
dered after plenary consideration, and the Court needs less jus-
tification for reconsidering them. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of 
San Diego, 4S3 u.s. 490, SOO (1981) (plurality) (citing cases). 
"It is not at all unusual for the Court to find it appropriate to 
give full consideration to a question that has been the subject 
of previous summary action." ~ (quoting Washington v. Yakima 
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 477 n. 20 (1979)). 
It is clear that the issue here is important enough to merit 
the Court's attention. The Court is procedurally able to decide 
the case if it wants to. CAll's decision is in confict with 
CAS's in Baker, and Dronenburg adds to the debate. The statute 
in Baker forbid engaging in oral or anal sex in a homosexual 
encounter. CAS held that Doe controlled and that engaging in 
homosexual conduct was therefore not a protected liberty inter-
est. CAS also rejected the plaintiff's equal protection claim, 
finding that homosexuals were not a suspect class, and that the 
"strong ob' ction to homosexual conduct, which has prevailed in 
Western culture for the past seven centuries" provided a rational 
basis for upholding the statute. Baker v. Wade, 
at 6448. There . is also a case pending befor n which the DC 
eterosexual adults who 
engage in sexual activity in private. Doe v. Duling, 603 F.Supp. 
960 (E.D. va. 1985), appeal pending. Last term, this Court af-
firmed by an equally divided Court a CAlO case that upheld an 
Okla. statute providing that teachers could be fired for "public 
homosexual activity," but struck down a restrict ion on their 
"public homosexual conduct," which included advocacy. Bd. of Ed. 
of the City of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force, 105 
s.ct. 1858 (1985), aff'd by an equally divided court, 729 F.2d 
12 7 0 ( CA 10 19 8 4) . 
The Court could put off the confrontation by allowing this 
case to go to trial for development of the facts and presentation 
of the state interest. It is possible that CAll next time will 
hear the case en bane and come out the other way. Also, the 
Court may want to delay in the hope that it will receive a case 
raising the issue in the context of heterosexuals, in which it 
might be less controversial and a smaller step to find a right of 
sexual privacy. 
On the other hand, it does not seem essential to have a 
trial before deciding the constitutional issue. The Court does 
not need additional facts to decide the case, and the State can 
present its interests in its brief to this Court. Also, CAll is 
unlikely to go en bane on the appeal from the trial. If CAll 
wanted to address en bane the essential issue in this case, it 
would have done so with this opinion. While a case involving 
heterosexuals will likely filter up from CA4 or a similar case 
might arise, heterosexuals may run into greater standing problems 
~------~--~---------------------------~ 
than does resp here. In the CA4 case, the unmarried, heterosex-
ual adult plaintiffs had engaged in sex and cohabited with other 
unmarrieds, and desire to do so in the future although they have 
abstained since the filing of the suit, partly because they fear 
prosecution. The defendants said there was a low probability of 
prosecution, but admitted that the statutes would be enforced if 
complaints were received and they had manpower available. Doe v. 
Duling, 603 F.Supp., supra, at 964. Further, although it would 
be a smaller step to find a right of sexual privacy among hetero-
s~, it might be difficult to preclude homosexuals from its 
coverage. And perhaps homosexuals need the protection more. If 
the Court finds no right to sexual privacy, it might be more 
desirable to render such a decision in case involving homosex-
uals. The Court might also want to grant cert to discuss what 
standards it wishes CAs to apply in connection with summary af-
firmances. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommen~. 
There is a response. 
September 25, 1985 Morrison Opn in petn 
\~ro: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: September 28, 1985 
RE: Bowers v. Hardwick, et al., No. 85-140 
Cert petition 
This petn raises the question whether a state 
statute criminalizing sodom is constitutional under the 
line of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
u.s. 479 (1965). The Court summarily affirmed a three-L.._._ __ _ 
judge DC decision that such a statute is constitutional in ,__.-------·--...... ------
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 u.s. 901 (1976). 
Since Doe, the Court has declined to discuss the issue. 
See Carey v. Population Services, 431 u.s. 678, 688 n. 5 
(1977). 
In this case, the ~1 found that (1) Doe was not 
controlling, since the Court's summary affirmance might 
have been based on standing concerns and not a decision on 
the merits, and (2) under the right-to- privacy cases, the 
Georgia sodomy statute is unconstitutional. Judge 
·•' 
~Kravi tch authored a persuasive dissent, arguing that Doe 
is control! ing. Judge Kravitch contended that if the 
Court's decision had been based on standing, the Court 
would have dismissed the appeal rather than summarily 
affirming. 
Since the CAll's decision was rendered in this 
v 
case, CAS (en bane, Reavley writing for the court) decided 
in a s~hat Doe controls and that the Texas 
sodomy Baker v. Wade, 
769 F. 2d 289 (CAS 198S). 
There is an argument that the Court should deny, 
and wait for the DC to try the case on remand. (CAll 
remanded for trial on the question whether the statute is 
a narrowly tailored means of advancing a compelling state 
interest.) Unlike the memo writer, I think this argument 
is strong. The decision in this case is an important one 
that may have implications for other forms of regulated 
private conduct (e.g. , some kinds of recreational drug 
use). The Court should therefore decide it on a proper 
record. (It's possible the state wi 11 be able to make a -record for the proposition that this statute is related to 
state efforts to control various diseases: that kind of 
• 'i. ~'¥l ..... 
interest would be hard for the state to discuss adequately 
in an appellate brief.) 
I 
On the other hand, this case gives the Court an 
opportunity to decide the issue without discussing it (if 
that's what the Court wishes to do). That is what Doe 
appeared to accomplish, and the CAll misunderstood the 
-
binding effect of the summary aff irrnance in Doe. The 
I 
Court could take this case and wr~3! bri_g_f opinion on 
'----
the proper application of summar affirmances. That would 
' ' 
(1) reverse the CAll's deci~ion in this case, and (2) put 
~--~ ? 
other federal courts r on notice that Doe decided this 
r 
issue. 
recommend DENY unless the Court 
I 
Consequently, I 
wishes to decide the merits issue simply by discussing the 
I 










From: Justice White 
OC1 1 7 1985 Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
GEORGIA v. MICHAEL HARDWICK, AND JOHN 
AND MARY DOE 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 85-140. Decided October-, 1985 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
On August 3, 1982, respondent Michael Hardwick was ar-
rested for committing the crime of sodomy with a consenting 
male adult within his home in violation of Georgia law. See 
0. C. G. A. § 16-6-2 (1984). * Charges were brought, and 
Hardwick was bound over to the Superior Court. At that 
point, however, the Atlanta District Attorney's office deter-
mined that it would not present the case to the grand jury 
unless further evidence was developed. 
Hardwick, along with the married couple of John and Mary 
Doe, then filed this suit in the U. S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia, asking that the Georgia sod-
omy statute be declared unconstitutional. The defendants in 
the suit were various Georgia officials, who are the petition-
ers here. Hardwick alleged that he was a practicing homo-
sexual, that he regularly engaged in homosexual acts, and 
that he intended to continue to do so in the future. The Does 
*Section 16-6-2 provides as follows: 
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits 
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or 
anus of another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy 
when he commits sodomy with force and against the will of the other 
person. 
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. A person con-
victed of the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by imprison-
ment for life or by ·imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 
years. 
2 BOWERS v. HARDWICK 
alleged that they wanted to participate in sexual activity pro-
scribed by the statute but that they had been "chilled and de-
terred" by the statute and by Hardwick's arrest. 
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure 
to state a claim, and the District Court granted the motion. 
It ruled that the Does had no standing to bring the suit and 
that Hardwick, although he had standing, had no actionable 
claim in light of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the 
City of Richmond, 425 U. S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 
1199 (ED Va. 1975). In Doe, this Court summarily affirmed 
a three-judge District Court's judgment upholding a Virginia 
criminal sodomy law against constitutional challenge. 
A panel of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir- L A L I 
cuit reversed. All three members of the panel first con-
Cluded that the District Court had correctly found that 
H rdwic had standin to brin the suit but that the Does did 
not. Turning to the merits o Hardwick's claim, the panel 
iiia,]ority then determined that Doe was not controlling. The 
majority concluded that, although only the constitutional is-
sues were presented in the jurisdictional statement in Doe, 
this Court's summary affirmance of the District Court's judg-
ment there could have been based on a determination that 
the Doe plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (since they pre-
sented no evidence of past or threatened prosecutions under 
the statute). Noting that a lower court should read a sum-
mary disposition as being based on the narrowest grounds 
possible, the majority concluded that Doe did not control the 
disposition of the constitutional questions raised by 
Hardwick. 
The majority found sup~ for this conclusion in recent ac-
tions of this Court. See· Carey v. Population Services, 431 
U. S. 678, 688, n. 5 (1977) (noting that "the Court has not de-
finitively answered the difficult question whether and to 
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulat-
ing [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults"). 
See also ~nger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984) (per 
BOWERS v. HARDWICK 3 
curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted in case involving state statute prohibiting loitering in 
public places for the purpose of soliciting "deviate sexual be-
havior"). These decisions, concluded the panel majority, in-
dicate that the constitutional question presented here is still 
open for consideration. 
Turning to the merits of the constitutional questions pre-
sented, the majorit found that the Georgia statute did in-
fringe HardWic 's fun amental constitutional rights: It impli-
cated his private associational interests-interests which the 
majority found were particularly strong where he planned to 
carry out his sexual activities in the privacy of h~ home. 
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). See als<f'Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). Thus, the majority determined 
that the statute could only be upheld if it were shown by the 
state to serve a co~ interest and to be 
the most narrowly drawn means of serving that interest. 
One judge dissented from the panel's decision on the mer-
its. The dissent concluded that Doe controlled. The dissent 
observed t~ere would have meant that 
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The appeal was 
not dismissed for want of jurisdiction, however, and the sum-
mary affirmance thus indicates that Doe was a decision on the 
merits of the constitutional issues. The dissent also dis-
agreed with the inferences the majority drew from Carey and 
Uplinger: Carey simply indicated that this Court has not yet 
passed on many statutes regulating sexual conduct, and the 
majority inferred too much from the dismissal of the writ in 
Uplinger. 
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case that Doe is not 
controlling prece ent con lets With decisions ~her ir-
cw~Wad;,769 F. 2d 289, 292 (CM/1985) (en 
bane) (upholding state sodomy law based on determination 
that Doe is controlling); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F. 2d 1388, 
1391-1392 ~ 1984) (indicating that Doe should probably 
4 BOWERS v. HARDWICK 
be held to control on question of constitutional rights respect-
ing homosexual activities). Further, the majority's deter-
mination, assuming that Doe does not control, that 
Hardwick's constitutional rights have been infringed conflicts 
with the conclusion of the District of Columbia Circuit that no 
constitutional right to engage in homosexual conduct exists. 
See Dronenburg, supra, 741 F. 2d, at 1397. Given this lack 
of consistency among the Circuits on this important constitu-
tional question, I would grant the petition. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell March 29, 1986 
From: Mike 
No. 85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick 
On Writ of Certiorari to the CAll 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Does the constitutional right of privacy give respondent 
a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy? 
...__-
FACTS 
Respondent Bowers was arrested for violation of Georgia 
Code Ann. §16-6-2(a) (1984), which states that "A person commits 
the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual 
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus 
of another." The county attorney decided that there was insuffi-
.. ' 
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cient evidence to prosecute. The state has until August 3, 1986 
to present the case to a grand jury if it chooses to do so. Be-
cause he is still under the threat of possible prosecution, re-
spondent brought suit in the Northern District of Georgia on Feb. 
14, 1983. His complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the 
Georgia statute was unconstitutional. The DC disposed of 
Hardwick's claims by citation to this Court's summary affirmance 
in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 
1975), aff'd, 425 u.s. 901 (1976). The CAll rev'd. It held that 
the statute implicates fundamental rights, and that it did not 
involve any of the "public ramifications" that attend "sexual 
activity with children or with persons who are coerced either 
through physical force or commercial inducement." App. 26. The 
CAll distinguished Doe on very flimsy grounds, and if the Court 
was of the mind to do so, it could simply reverse on the basis of 
the CAll's misapprehension of the precedential value of a summary 
affirmance, as explained very well in Judge Kravitch's dissent. 
Because I do not think the Court ought to take that approach, I 
will not discuss the Doe issue. The CAll remanded for trial in 
order to allow the State to show, if it could, that it had a com-
pelling interest in support of the statute. This Court granted 
cert from that decision. 
DISCUSSION 
A 
It is extremely important to set out what this case is 
not about. Mr. Tribe and some of the amici frame this case in 
page 3. 
apocalyptic terms that would require this Court to answer a host 
of questions not presented by the case. 
1. This case is not about state regulation of sexual conduct be-
tween married partners. Both courts below agreed that the mar-
r ied couple ("John and Mary Doe") who only alleged a fear of 
prosecution lacked standing. Their claims are not before this 
Court. In addition, the state practically concedes that the 
statute cannot apply to married couples. For the same reason, 
the statute's application to unmarried heterosexual partners is 
_____, 
not before the Court. Because the statute is subject to a limit-
ing construction, the Court only should consider the precise ap-
plication of the statute presented by this case- ~homosexual sod- ~~ 
IAA ~~ j 
~ \ "'Y""'t 
omy. 
2. This is not a case about the means chosen to enforce the stat-
ute, or the range of punishment available under the statute. 
Hardwick has not yet been prosecuted for the violation; for all 
the Court knows, he may be acquitted. This is an important 
point. It may be constitutionally permissible for the State to ----- ~-
impermissible to put someone in prison for that offense. But 
that is a separate issue not raised in this case. The question 
whether a certain punishment is impermissible, even though the 
State may criminalize or otherwise discourage the conduct, is a 
question of proportionality. Your opinion in Solem v. Helm, 463 
u.s. 277 (1983), articulated the principles for determining un-
constitutionally disproportionate punishment. I think it would 
be entirely proper for the Court, in some future case, to consid-
er the proportionality of, e.g., imprisonment for an offense like 
homosexual sodomy or adultery. In that future case, I would be 
inclined to conclude that criminalizing certain conduct could be -constitutionally disproportionate to the conduct at issue. Jus-
tice Harlan implied as much in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 
u.s. 497, 547-548 (1961) ("the moral presupposition on which ap-
pellants ask us to pass judgment could form the basis of a vari-
ety of legal rules and administrative choices, each presenting a 
different issue for adjudication.") But that issue is not pre-
sented here. 
Similarly, and as you noted in your file memo, this is 
not a case that requires a judgment about what one would do as a 
legislator, but about what the Constitution does or does not for-
bid the State from regulating. That self-evident point often 
gets lost in the discussion of this case in the briefs. The fact 
that notable authorities support decriminalization, or that such 
a result would be fairer or more tolerant than the existing stat-
ute, are the sort of argument one makes to a legislature. In 
fact, those very arguments have successfully been made to twenty-
~ 3 AJ~t s to date. This Court's task is not to d-;;;;:de~ 
~ what the "best" statute would be, but only to decide whether the q 
~~~onstitution forbids the one Georgia has chosen. 
~-' 3. This is not a case about the "sanctity of the home." If there 
exists a right of homosexual sodomy, it would not be limited to 
the home, although the state presumably could regulate some 
areas, like homosexual "bath houses," on public health grounds. 




strengthen the case for the existence of the right. It may well 
be appropriate to look at the "sanctity of the home" argument in 
a case where the Court is evaluating the propriety of the means 
of enforcement, but as I have said, that question is not present-
ed here. The for respondent's argument 
a fundamental 
right 394 u.s. 557 (1969). Stanley, how-
ever, 
-1! , ... 
case involving freedom of thought: 
"Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giv-
ing government the power to control men's minds." Id., at 565. 
Respondent's argument that the "home surely protects more than 
our fantasies alone" is just mistaken rhetoric. The 
thought/action distinction is an important one. A man may fanta-
~ .__ - ------. 
size all he wants in his home about using cocaine or battering 
his wife, but if he actually does either, the State is free to 
punish him notwithstanding the fact that the conduct took place 
in his home. 
Respondent cites other cases in support of this point. 
They almost all are Fourth Amendment cases. One of the most 
v 
egregious misuses of a case is respondent's citation to Oliver v. , .. 
United States, 466 u.s. 170, 179 (1984) (the home "provide[s] the 
setting for those intimate activities that the Fourth Amendment ~I
 is intended to shelter from governmental interference.") Oliver 
~ ac;wy is a case about the "ope~ne" and involved r. • J"a search of a marijuana field a mile from petitioner's house. 
'./.. 




vide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment 
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t~J I 11 ~1 t-r 
is intended to shelter from government interference or surveil-
lance." Only by such strained reading of standard Fourth Amend-
rnent cases is respondent able to obtain authority for the argu-
rnent that the sanctity of the horne affects this case. Obviously 
respondent is entitled to the protection that the Fourth Amend-
rnent gives to every person in his horne, whether or not this be-
havior was properly made a crime. But the Fourth Amendment does 
not speak to whether the State can make something a cr irne, or 
otherwise punish certain behavior. 
B 
Once the range of issues is properly narrowed, this case 
presents a fairly discrete legal issue: Does the constitutional -------. 
right of privacy protect the right to engage in homosexual sod-
orny? 
1. What is the source of the right of privacy? There is no right 
of privacy specifically mentioned in the Constitution. The Court 
has long recognized that this right "emanates from the penumbras" 
of the specific sections of the Constitution. Justice Harlan in 
Poe v. Ullman specifically linked the right of privac*1 to the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarentee of protection against 
the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process -. 
of law. Poe, 367 u.s., at 540. His reasoning was that a right 
of privacy is contained within the protection of ~ubstantive due 
process~-an analysis that has since become generally accepted. 
2. What are the limits on the right of privacy? Almost every 
Justice ever to write an opinion based on the right of privacy 
has treated like a very dangerous, but necessary, tool. Each has 
--------
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been careful to reiterate that the substantive due 
Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494, 502 (1976) (opinion of POWELL, J.) The 
need for caution arises out of the fact that there are so few 
limits on the judicial recognition of a 
1t ight of privacy. The 
limits that do exist do not come from any external source, but 
from the ~w~osed limits found in its cases. 
~Harlan's a.?t in Poe v. Ullman once again_!j' 
instructive. He St-atet~-that "[e)ach new claim to Constitutional 
protection must be considered against a background of Constitu-
tional purposes, as they have been rationally perceive and his-
torically developed." Id., at 544. History and tradition figure 
prominently in many other statements regarding the limits to the 
right~---tional limit to Justice Goldgerg, who struggled to find a ra-~ the right of privacy, instructed that judges -
"must look at the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our 
~--------------------------~----
people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] 
as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 u.s., at 493. Moore v. City of East Cleveland also refers to 
tradition as an 
V"'" 
important guide. Roe v. Wade explained that 
"only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut 
are included in this guifentee of personal privacy." 410 
u.s., at 152. 
The focus on history and tradition results from the fact 
that the right of privacy is not intended to be the vanguard of 
changes in societal values. It is intended to protect those val-
ues that are imbedded in the fabric of our society, not to imbed 
new values into that fabric of its own force. One good reason 
for that conservative approach is to protect against "constitu-
tionalizing" temporary mood swings in our society. Before some-
' I "' thing can be recognized as a fundamental right, it must have 
----------~------------------------shown the permanence to establish itself in the history and tra-
-------------------------------------------------------------------ditions of our people. 
T~r;-_a __ n_d __ ~_r_a_d __ i_t~ seems to indi~ate that 
homosexual sodomy does not fit within the right of privacy. Not 
even respondent attempts to argue that our history and tradition 
have recognized homosexual sodomy as "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty." Instead, he argues that our society has long 
recognized the fundamental value of intimate sexual relations. 
But this Court's right of privacy cases have never recognized a 
broad-based right of sexual freedom. Instead, it has extended 
• ( '' protection to those sexual relationships that have traditionally 
been protected and recognized in , our society--those that relate 
( ( ,, 
to marriage and other family relationships. Up through the 
present time, every one of the Court's right of privacy cases can 
be explained in terms of a concern for the fundamental right of - ...____ -- ; 
marital and family privacy. While a fuller explanation will fol-
low oral argument, a brief summary may illustrate the point. 
1. The child rearing and education cases: This group of cases is 
illustrated by Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 u.s. 510 (1925), 
involving a law requiring all parents to send their young chil-
dren to public schools. The Court recognized a parental to di-
rect the upbringing of their children, and that the "fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its chil-
dren by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers 
only." 268 u.s., at 535. 
\' /1 • • • • 
2. The marital sexual privacy cases: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
u.s. 479 (1965) illustrates the point that the Court has protect-
ed decisions about marital sexuality from state intrusion. ----------
3. Cases about the decision to marry: Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
u.s. 374 (1978) invalidated a state statute that imposed a sig-
nificant burden on the decision of some people to marry. In your 
opinion concurring in the judgment, you cautioned that not all 
impediments to marriage were impermissible. You recognized a 
"right of marital and family privacy which place some substantive 
limits on the regulatory power of government" because marriage 
"is one of the basic civil right of man," but noted that "the 
State, representing the collective expression of moral aspira-
tions, has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of 
domestic relations relfect the widely held values of its people. 
State regulation has included bans on incest, bigamy, and 
homosexuality ... A 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast 
doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have fash-
ioned to govern marriage and divorce." Id., at 398-399. See 
also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494 (1977) (pro-
tecting the right of an extended family to live together. Cf. 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 u.s. 1 (1974), denying the 
same protection to six college roommates) . 
J:"-'";J- --· 
3. The abortion cases: These cases also reflect the Court's limit 
of the right of privacy to marriage and family. The state stat-
utes that prohibit or severely limit access to an abortion have 
the effect of forcing a woman to bring a family into existence. 
For unmarried women, the abortion decision is not a decision 
about her commitment to her sexual partner; it is a decision 
about long-term commitments to her potential offspring. It in-
volves a relationship at least as protected as the husband-wife 
relationship--the relationship of a mother and her child. It is 
not her interest in sexual freedom that protects even an unmar-
ried minor's right to an abortion; rather, it is her potential 
relationship and commitment to a child she does not want to bear-
-her interest in not having the state require her to become a 
mother. 
Without belaboring the point, I am convinced that the 
right of privacy as it relates to this case has been limited thus 
far to marriage and other family relationships, protecting the 
family and the right of potential procreation. These values have 
properly been found by the Court to be fundamental, even essen-
tial, to our society. So limited, the right of privacy does not 
extend to protect "sexual freedom" in the absence of the funda-
mental values of family and procreation. 
Moreover, I believe that it is important that the right 
of privacy be so limited. Presently, the right of privacy can be 
explained in terms of the fundamental values of marriage, family, 
and procreation. That represents one of the few limits on a very 
broad constitutional principle. Respondent does not seek to get 
around that limit by arguing that homosexual sodomy is a funda-
mental value. Rather, he contends that the right of privacy ex-
tends to personal sexual conduct regardless of any relationship 
to marriage, family, or procreation. If that is recognized as a 
fundamental value, then no limiting principle comes readily to 
mind. Areas that long have been held to be within the tradition-
al concern of the States will have to be justified in terms of 
their effect on personal sexual freedom. If, for example, a man 
is entitled to consensual sexual freedom with the partner of his 
choice, what principle allows the state to prevent him from pay-
ing for sex with a willing partner? Respondent's reply is that 
the state can regulate prostitution as commerce. I cannot see 
how commerce would justify a state from criminalizing conduct 
that the parties have a fundamental right to engage in. If the 
state cannot regulate the sexual conduct of a man with one part-
ner, on what basis can it regulate his conduct with more than one 
partner? These questions do not have easy answers once the right 
of privacy leaves the confines of marriage, family, and procre-
ation and enters the expanding world of personal sexuality. 
More importantly, I 
privacy cases 
think the fact that the right of f 
are limited to marriage, family, and procreation 
accurately reflects the traditions of our people. Personal sexu-
at free~m is a newcom~r a~ur national v~lues, and may well 
be, as discussed earlier, a temporary national mood that fades. 
That may be reflected in the fact that in the 1970's twenty 
states decriminalized homosexual sodomy, while in the 1980's only 
two states have done so. This healthy "laboratory of experimen-
tation" among the different states properly reflects the differ-
ing and sometimes changing values of our people, even from state 
to state. I would respect those differences. The right of pri-
vacy calls for the greatest judicial restraint, invalidating only 
those laws that impinge on those values that are basic to our 
country. I do not think that this case involves any such value. 
I recommend reversal. 
'\' ... 
March 31, 1986 
BOWERS GINA-POW 
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick (CAll) 
To be argued March 31 
MEMO TO Mike: 
This case, that we should not have taken, involves 
the validity of the Georgia statute that makes sodomy a 
misdemeanor. The facts are straight forward (if one can 
use that term in this case!). Respondent Hardwick, a male 
homosexual, was arrested for committing sodomy with a 
consenting male adult in the bedroom of his home. After 
charges were brought, the district attorney decided not to 
present the case to the grand jury. (Possibly the crime 
is a felony of some level). Although not convicted, 
Hardwick filed this suit in federal district court seeking 
a declaration that the Georgia statute is unconstitutional 
as applied to a private homosexual act. 
In addition to Hardwick, a married couple called 
"John and Mary Doe" also joined the complaint, asserting 
generally that they also engaged in such conduct and were 
concerned about the possibility of arrest. 
The threshold issue with respect to both respondents 
is whether or not they had standing. The Court of 
..... 
Appeals, (Johnson and Tuttle) concluded that the threat of 
prosecution under the statute in light of its past 
enforcement against Hardwick - was adequate to give him 
standing. It found no basis for standing on behalf of 
John and Mary Doe. Judge Kravitch agreed with the 
majority of CAll on the standing issues. 
On the merits, the threshold question was whether the 
Court of Appeals was bound by our summary affirmance of a 
three-judge district court, sustaining the validity of 
Virginia's Sodomy statute, in Doe v. Commonwealth's 
Attorney of the City of Richmond, 425 u.s. 901. The DC in 
this case concluded that it was bound by this summary 
affirmance, but_again Judges Johnson and Tuttle of CAll 
concluded in light of various dicta in subsequent 
decisions - that the Court of Appeals was free not to 
follow our decision in Doe. Judge Kravitch, in a brief 
dissent, believed that the Court of Appeals was "bound" by 
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. 
If I were on a Court of Appeals, I would agree with 
Judge Kravitch that our summary affirmance in the Virginia 
case never overruled was controlling. I know, 
however, from experience here that this Court can usually 
find a way not to follow a summary affirmance. See 
Mandale v. Bradley, 432 u.s. 173. Although I would 
certainly consider joining four to agree with Judge 
Kravitch and the DC that we would have to overrule the 
Virginia case before reaching the merits here, my guess is 
that a majority of the Court will decide that language in 
subsequent cases (see Judge Johnson's opinion) signaled 
that the validity of private consensual sodomy was an open 
question. 
The question is now presented to us in the narrowest 
possible terms. Professor Tribe, with his usual over-
blown rhetoric, does focus his claim in the narrowest 
possible language: 
"Whether the state of Georgia may send its 
police into private bedrooms to arrest adults 
for engaging in consensual, non-commer ical 
sexual acts, with no justification beyond the 
assertion that those acts are immoral". 
Again, Professor Tribe argues that Georgia may not 
extend its "criminal law into the very bedrooms of its 
citizens to break up wholly consensual sexual relations 
between willing adults." One also may be surprised, in 
the context of sodomy, to have Professor Tribe repeatedly 
referring to the "sanctity of the home". 
In view of my age, general background and convictions 
as to what is best for society, I think a good deal can be 
said for the validity of statutes that criminalize sodomy. 
If it becomes sufficiently wide-spread, civilization 
itself will be severely weakened as the perpetuation of 
the human race depends on normal sexual relations just as 
is true in the animal world. 
Despite the foregoing, if I were in the 
legislature I would vote to decriminalize sodomy. 
state 
It is 
widely prevalent in some places (e.g., San Francisco), and 
is a criminal statute that almost never is enforced. 
Moreover, police have more important responsibilities than 
snooping around trying to catch people in the act of 
sodomy. But the question here is not what a legislator 
would do. The legislatures of a majority of the states -
I believe since the founding of the Republic have 
continued to criminalize sodomy, and our duty is to 
determine whether such statutes violate rights protected 
by the Constitution. 
As the briefs all recognize, there is nothing 
explicit in the Constitution on this subject. Yet, this 
Court has frequently recognized that there are human 
rights that can be derived from the concept of liberty in 
.Jo 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The most dramatic example is 
Roe v. Wade, in which the Court (6-3) found that liberty 
and privacy interests - derived from the Bill of Rights 
and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment - support the 
abortion decision prior to viability. One of the best 
discussions of this subject that I am familiar with is 
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 
beginning at 539. Incidentally, in that dissent, Justice 
Harlan explicitly refers to homosexuality as not within 
the right of privacy that he found to exist with respect 
to the use of contraceptives. See pp. 546 and 553. 
It is clear that, as in Roe v. Wade, the issue here 
is whether there is a substantive due process right -
within the meaning of liberty and privacy - to engage in 
private, consensual sodomy. At present, I think 
substantial arguments can be made on both sides of this 
question. The weight of modern thinking at least supports 
decriminalization. See The Model Criminal Code, and 
resolutions cited in Tribe's brief adopted by a number of 
national organizations including several church 
denominations. A different view, however, may be taken 
with respect to whether the Constitution requires the 
invalidation of a criminal statute. 
It is tempting to accept the very narrow argument 
made by Professor Tribe. Apart from other considerations, 
it is impossible in any realistic sense to detect and 
later convict adult citizens who engage consensually in 
homosexual conduct in a truly private setting- e.g., what 
fairly may be called home. I must say that when Professor 
Tribe refers to the "sanctity of the home", I find his 
argument repellant. Also it is insensitive advocacy. 
"Home" is one of the most beautiful words in the English 
language. It usually connotes family, husband and wife, 
and children - although, of course, single persons, widows 
and widowers, and others also have genuine homes. 
A problem would be to identify some limiting 
principle if we are inclined to agree with the Court of 
Appeals and Professor Tribe. A number of examples and 
questions come to mind: would the term "home" embrace a 
hotel room, a mobile trailer (yes, I think), a private 
room made available in a house of prostitution or even in 
a public bar, the "sanctity" of a toilet in a public 
restroom? 
And if sodomy is to be decriminalized on 
constitutional grounds, what about incest, bigamy and 
adultery. Incidentally, is there a Supreme Court decision 
holding that bigamy is unconstitutional? It is not easy 
for me to see why a husband in the privacy of two homes 
should not lawfully have two wives if liberty and privacy 
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, require 
invalidation of anti-sodomy laws. 
As you can see, Mike, I am not talking very much like 
a lawyer. There are a number of cases cited in the briefs 
that perhaps are relevant. It might be helpful if you 
identify only the very few that are any where near close. 
Possibly Griswold v. Connecticut, Carey v. Population 
Services, and possibly Eisenstadt v. Baird, are relevant. 
Both parties rely on my decision in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland. If that case is relevant to any extent, it 
would support reversal. 
In sum, Mike, I am sorry you had to be burdened with 
this case. I probably will not make up my mind until 
after the oral arguments and Conference discuss ion. I 
would, however, like a summary memo as to how the case 
should be analyzed. 
LFP, JR. 
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Again, Professor Tribe argues that Georgia may not 
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citizens to break up wholly consensual sexual relations 
between willing adults." One also may be surprised, in 
the context of sodomy, to have Professor Tribe repeatedly 
referring to the "sanctity of the home". 
In view of my age, general background and convictions 
as to what is best for society, I think a good deal can be 
said for the validity of statutes that criminalize sodomy. 
If it becomes sufficiently wide-spread, civilization 
itself will be severely weakened as the perpetuation of 
the human race depends on normal sexual relations just as 
is true in the animal world. 
Despite the foregoing, if I were in the state 
legislature I would vote to deer iminal ize sodomy. It is 
widely prevalent in some places (e.g., San Francisco), and 
is a criminal statute that almost never is enforced. 
Moreover, police have more important responsibilities than 
snooping around trying to catch people in the act of 
sodomy. But the question here is not what a legislator 
would do. The legislatures of a majority of the states -
I believe since the founding of the Republic have 
continued to criminalize sodomy, and our duty is to 
determine whether such statutes violate rights protected 
by the Constitution. 
As the briefs all recognize, there is nothing 
explicit in the Constitution on this subject. Yet, this 
Court has frequently recognized that there are human 
rights that can be derived from the concept of liberty in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The most dramatic example is 
Roe v. Wade, in which the Court {6-3) found that liberty 
and privacy interests - derived from the Bill of Rights 
and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment - support the 
abortion decision prior to viability. One of the best 
discussions of this subject that I am familiar with is 
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 
beginning at 539. Incidentally, in that dissent, Justice 
Harlan explicitly refers to homosexuality as not within 
the right of privacy that he found to exist with respect 
to the use of contraceptives. See pp. 546 and 553. 
It is clear that, as in Roe v. Wade, the issue here 
is whether there is a substantive due process right -
within the meaning of liberty and privacy - to engage in 
private, consensual sodomy. At present, I think 
substantial arguments can be made on both sides of this 
question. The weight of modern thinking at least supports 
decriminalization. See The Model Criminal Code, and 
resolutions cited in Tribe's brief adopted by a number of 
national organizations including several church 
denominations. A different view, however, may be taken 
with respect to whether the Constitution requires the 
invalidation of a criminal statute. 
• 
It is tempting to accept the very narrow argument 
made by Professor Tribe. Apart from other considerations, 
it is impossible in any realistic sense to detect and 
later convict adult citizens who engage consensually in 
homosexual conduct in a truly private setting- e.g., what 
fairly may be called home. I must say that when Professor 
Tribe refers to the "sanctity of the home", I find his 
argument repellant. Also it is insensitive advocacy. 
"Home" is one of the most beautiful words in the English 
language. It usually connotes family, husband and wife, 
and children - although, of course, single persons, widows 
and widowers, and others also have genuine homes. 
A problem would be to identify some limiting 
principle if we are inclined to agree with the Court of 
Appeals and Professor Tribe. A number of examples and 
questions come to mind: would the term "home" embrace a 
hotel room, a mobile trailer (yes, I think), a private 
room made available in a house of prostitution or even in 
a public bar, the "sanctity" of a toilet in a public 
restroom? 
if sodomy is to be decriminalized on 
ional grounds, what about incest, bigamy and 
Incidentally, is there a Supreme Court decision 
. . 
holding that bigamy is unconstitutional? It is not easy 
for me to see why a husband i'n the privacy of two homes 
should not lawfully have two wives if liberty and privacy 
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, require 
invalidation of anti-sodomy laws. 
As you can see, Mike, I am not talking very much like 
a lawyer. There are a number of cases cited in the briefs 
that perhaps are relevant. It might be helpful if you 
identify only the very few that are any where near close. 
Possibly Griswold v. Connecticut, Carey v. Population 
Services, and possibly Eisenstadt v. Baird, are relevant. 
Both parties rely on my decision in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland. If that case is relevant to any extent, it 
would support reversal. 
In sum, Mike, I am sorry you had to be burdened with 
this case. I probably will not make up my mind until 
after the oral arguments and Conference discussion. I 
would, however, 1 ike a summary memo as to how the case 
should be analyzed. 
LFP, JR . 
- ' 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
1...._ d~M.-/.W..AJ.-17 ~ 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike zs- ... lt~-o 
Re: Oral argument in Bowers v. Hardwick 
"'-
Date: March 31, 1986 
1. In response to your question regarding incest, Prof. Tribe 
stated that the principle that distinguished an incest statute 
from this one was that the state could logically assume that a 
daughter never could truly consent to sex with her father. That 
ignores many other forms of incest, such as brother-sister in-
cest. The importance of this ommission is not that it points up 
some technical flaw in his argument. Rather, it illustrates a 
central concern If a brother and sis-
ter are adults, and use contraception or abortion to prevent an 
unhealthy child, then the state's only real interest behind a 
~ 
~ statute forbidding sexual contact between them is that it thinks 
-- interest is morally wrong. Yet Mr. Tribe repeatedly--and conde- ~· / 
scendingly--dismissed the state's interest in legislating some _____, 
moral principle. ·But this Court repeatedly has stated that the 
state does have a legitimate interest in legislating morality. --------- ~ ~-------------------------------
See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 u.s. 49, 60 
(1973) ("there is a 'right of the Nation and of the States to 
maintain a decent society'" quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 u.s. 
184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 u.s. 413, 457 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The logic of Mr. Tribe's position is expansive. He con-
tends that if an activity takes place in the home, and is consen-
sual and does not do physical damage or pose a health risk (a 
debatable proposition with regard to homosexual sodomy) then the 
state cannot regulate it merely on the basis that the state 
thinks it is wrong or dehumanizing. That logically implicates 
recreational drug use, at least with marijuana, incest, suicide, 
and bestiality. Moreover, if the state cannot defend a statute 
"""""""'" ....... --
on moral grounds, I do not see a strong alternative grounds for 
criminalizing prostitution. Tribe's response that the state can 
somehow rely on its power to regulate commerce seems absurd to 
me, once the underlying activity is said to implicate a fundamen-
tal right. His repeated denial of any valid state purpose in 
enacting legislation backed up only by a moral interest has seri-
ous implications for pornography laws as well. In addition, I do 
not see how his limiting principle that the state's power to en-
force contracts would allow the state to regulate adultery and 
bigamy works, if all parties are consenting adults. 
Justice Stevens appeared to think that the state did not 
really have an important interest in this statute, because it did 
not prosecute this case when it was handed to them on a "silver 
platter." He relied on the fact that respondent had admitted 
that he committed the acts in his civil complaint and that he 
intended do so in the future. First, the fact that Fulton County 
attorney declined to prosecute this case does not implicate the 
state at all. The state does not tell the county attorney which 
cases to prosecute, and the county attorney in Fulton County {At-
lanta) may well have views on these matters that differ from the 
State • Second, the fact that a person admits something in his 
• < 
civil complaint does not mean that he would be willing to do so 
in his criminal prosecution. Nor does the fact that he states 
his intention to violate the law in the future help the state at 
all. 
%£"·11/.D IJ~vl-f~ · -
(P~!r-v-~~ ~~~ ~ 
,/..41..-.L~ J.Li-c.. ~) 
1. You raised the possibility that the Constitution might 
protect homosexual relationships that resemble marriage--
~ stable, monogomous relationships involving members of the 
j ~ same sex. I think this is not a good approach, for 
~/"- several reasons. First, this Court has held that the 
~1 J.,v1ur Constitution protects marriage largely because marriage :1J!. 0, 
7 has traditionally been fostered and protected in our 
~~ society. Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, 
~~ J , dissenting) (marriage is "an institution which the 
d-"'~- . 
~ State not only must allow, but which always and in every 
age it has fostered and protected") • But the kind of 
marriage that our society has traditionally protected 
clearly is heterosexual, not homosexual. It would be 
bootstrapping to say that marriage is protected because of 
our history and tradition, and then add that homosexual 
relationships are protected because they "resemble" 
marriage. 
Second, once you conclude that homosexual and 
heterosexual "marriages" are of equal Constitutional 
status, you would necessarily suggest that homosexuals 
have a right to adopt and raise children. Further, states 
would have great difficulty justifying other restrictions 
on homosexuality--such as no avowed homosexual public 
L.. 
school teachers--since the Constitution would place homo-
and heterosexual relationships on a par with each other. 
These possibilities suggest that the "marriage" idea has 
too many implications for other cases that you might wish 
to decide differently. Better to take a course in this 
case that leaves open other, closer cases. 
2. There are two other "middle courses" available 
~
.)';"' to you here. ~ you could decide that the ~th 
~ ~Am~ bars criminalizing private, consensual sexual 
.• "~ ~ (' conduct between consenting adults, ~here the conduct does ?~ 
~ v· 9 not cause demonstrable physical or psychological injury]) 
~ All human beings have a physical and psychological drive 
~· to have sex; moreover, virtually all people satisfy that drive from time to time. It would be "cruel and unusual" 
to stigmatize someone as a criminal for satisfying a 
physical/psychological urge shared by all people in a way 
that 1 s common in society and that doesn 1 t demonstrably 
injure anyone. Thus, the state could not put people in 
jail for having sex at all, or even for having sex outside 
--> 
3. 
marriage. And respondent alleges 1 that he has the same 
kind of urge to have sex as most heterosexuals have. To 
punish for acting on that urge, in a 
concededly private setting and with a consenting 
~
is morally equivalent to punishing heterosexuals. 






In Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660 (1962), the Court 
invalidated a statute that criminalized the status of 
being a drug addict. Justice Stewart's opinion for the 
Court relied in part on the fact that one couldn't help 
one's physical desires, and equated the punishment at 
issue to imprisoning someone "for the 'crime' of having a 
common cold." 370 u.s., at 667. In Powell v. Texas, 392 
u.s. 514 (1968), five members Qf the Court concluded that 
Robinson also forbids criminalizing the act of getting .....________ --
drunk when the actor is an alcoholic. 2 Those five ....._...... 
lThis case arises on the state's motion to dismiss, 
which was granted by the DC. (CAll reversed that grant.) 
Thus, respondent's al e ations about his own homosexuality 
must be ta en as true. 
~
2The Court actually affirmed the conviction in Powell, 
but Justice White, the critical fifth vote to affirm, did 
so on the ground that the defendant was not compelled to 
be drunk li. n public ~ Justice White made clear that his 
vote would have been different had the state simply 
punished drunkenness. 
4. 
Justices reasoned that " [ c] r iminal penal ties may not be 
inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is 
powerless to change." Id., at 567 (Fortas, J., joined by 
IX:>uglas, BRENNAN, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting); accord 
id., at 548 (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Ll \~ 
Moreover, the Justices applied the principle to conduct--
getting intoxicated--that was naturally compelled by the ,..._ . 
"condition" that the defendant was "powerless to change." 
f According 
\ change" his 
to respondent Hardwick, he is "powerless to -
homosexual. Having sex with status as a 
another man is naturally compelled by that status. Powell 
is therefore fairly persuasive support for a holding that 
he may not be criminally punished merely for having sex.3 
3This argument does not prevent the state from punishing 
drug possession, even by addicts. An addict's first use 
of an adc1icti ve drug is usually voluntary, while 
respondent's first experience with sex was naturally 
im e e y n1 reex1st1n urges. . e alcoholic 
in Powell 1s more . 1 e ne omosexual than the drug addict 
because the alcoholic's first drink, while voluntary, was 
not in any way blameworthy. Society permits--and even 
encourages--drinking in many circumstances.) 
Moreover, drug use causes demonstrable social 
evils. That simply isn't the c_gse with respec€ t:o~he 
private ract1ce-o~ity. Thus, tne scate would 
have an ve whe m1ng 1 eres in punishing the use of 
l illegal drugs, while its interest in punishing homosexual conduct must be much less substantial. 
Finally, the state can advance whatever interests 
(Footnote continued) 
!>. 
3. The other middle approach is narrower. You 
could apply your decision in Solem v. Helm, 463 u.s. 277 
(1983) to Georgia's statute and hold that it is 
disproportionate to sentence someone to 1 
or more in jail merely for a consensual, private sex 
The argument would be similar to the argument I just 
made, except that you would stop short of decriminalizing 
'~ 
this kind of conduct altog~ther. This has the virtue of 
leaving more options open for the future. 
(Footnote 3 continued from previous page) 
it has in this case by means other than criminalizing sex. 
? The state might seek-ro--Dar- homosexuals from teaChing in 
public schools, or might advertise its disapproval of 
homosexuality to children and adolescents. Such actions 
are like discouraging excessive consumption of liquor, 
which would be constitutional even after Powell v. Texas. 
To: Justice Powell 
Re: Robinson/Powell argument in Bowers v. Hardwick 
There are two possible uses of the Robinson/Powell 
argument raised in last night's memo. 
1. You could--quite properly--describe the case as only raising - -,____ 
the question whether the Constitution embodies a fundamental 
to engage in homosexual sodomy. On that basis, you could 
vote to reverse. You could explain, however, that if the issue 
of the constitutionality of the punishment were presented, you 
would hold it unconstitutional to imprison someone for sodomy on 
the basis of Robinson/Powell. You could make that argument in a 
concurring opinion (if the majority votes to reverse) or a 
separate dissenting opinion (if a majority recognizes a 
fundamental right). The argument would then be av~ilable in the 
first case that squarely raises the constitutionality of the 
punishment. 
C~ 2. The Robinson/Powell argument als_o __ c_o_u_l_d ___ b_e_~o supp~rt 
~ ~ffirmance, but for different reasons than expressed by the CAll. 
~ ou could say that respondent has raised a facial challenge to 
~~alidity of the statute, and that theref~ its p~hment 
~~~sian can be viewed in the abstract. . Viewed that way, it 
~y ~~horized at least one year and as much as twenty years 
prisonment for sodomy. You could conclude that ~sentencing 
~nder the statute would violate the Eighth Amendment, and that 
therefore the statute is facially unconstitutional. The problem 
with that position is that (i) the arguement has not been briefed 
. ' 
or argued by the parties or explained in any court opinion, and 
(ii) it is not the "ususal" method of Eighth Amendment analysis, 
which examines the actual punishment given in a particular case. 
Neither of these is an insurmountable obstacle. If the majority 
was to affirm, you would then be in a position of concurring in 
the judgment. 
The strength of both positions is that it removes the 
-= 
fundamental unfairness of the statute without getting into the 
~---------~ 
serious problems that would accompany recognition of a 
fundamental right. 
~: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140 
Date: April 2, 1986 
Georgia Code Ann. §16-6-2 makes sodomy a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more 
than 20 years. The same section also defines the crime of 
~
aggravated sodomy, and authorizes a greater punishment. The 
Virginia statute at issue in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney made 
sodomy a Class 6 felony punishable by not less than one year nor 
more than five years in prison. 
As to the Robinson/Powell argument, the three of us who 
worked on the theory last night--Anne, Bill, and !--continue to 
recommend that you use that theory to vote to reverse and write 
~------------- ~ 
here. This petr has not yet suffered, nor does it appear likely 
that he will suffer, any imprisonment. If he or someone else is 
convicted and sentenced, this argument will be available.We 
believe that it would be a mistake to create a fundamental right 
to protect this conduct. 
.. The Chief Justice ~ . 
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,.as£ringhm. Jl. <!J. 2ll,?,.;l 
April 3, 1986 12..L,~ """-" ~~ 
PERSONAL 
RE: Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140 
~ct..~~ 
'-'1A- ~ -U /~---­
~ ?4 J/1-t. ~~ 
.J~~~~ 
Dear Lewis: t.-Vk k ~I hci-
J~k~ 
I have some further thoughts on your suggestion at Conference 
that Hardwick cannot be punished because of hi~ "status" as a h~osex­
ual. <d-~~  . 
s~~ ~r~)tfo/% 
I suggest to you that this argument is not before us. Hardwick's 
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment contains no such claim. The 
argument was certainly not pressed at all by Hardwick's counsel in his 
brief or at oral argument. Hardwick's brief does not even cite either 
the Eighth Amendment or Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660 (1962). 
There are only two citat1ons to Robinson in the sixteen briefs that 
have been filed. The Amicus Brief of the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, 
at 20, cites Robinson merely in passing. The Amicus Brief for the 
Lesbian Rights ProJect, at 25 n.46, cites Robinson 1n a footnote, but 
even that group concedes that there is "an 1nteresting debate", yet to 
be resolved, about whether homosexuality is "a matter of genes ••• or 
of personal choice." Id., at 24-25. 
You will remember my "degree" in Psychiatry, which led me to be 
very skeptical about that breed of M.D.'s. I have never heard of any 
responsible member (or even an "avant-garde" member) of the A.P.A. who 
recognized homosexuality as an "addiction" in the sense of drug addic-
tion. It is simply without any basis in medicine, science, or common 
human experience. In fact these homosexuals themselves proclaim this 
is a matter of sexual "preference." Moreover, even if homosexuality 
is somehow conditioned, the decision to commit an act of sodomy is a 
choice, pure and simple -- maybe not so pure! 
We can only speculate as to why Hardwick did not make this par-
ticular argument that you advance. Maybe Hardwick did not want to 
become subject to "compulsory treatment programs," Robinson, suara, at 
665, that are prescribed for "helpless" people like narcotics a diets. 
But whatever the reason, are we really to ignore the theory of 
Hardwick's lawsuit and render an opinion on entirely different grounds 
without the guidance of any briefing or argument or even history? 
Even if I thought that the Eighth Amendment issue were before us, 
I would reject it for the same reason that I reject the Fourteenth 
Amendment argument actually made by Hardwick. Both arguments are ex-
tremely dangerous because they prove far too much. The Fourteenth 
Amendment argument goes !9.Q __ f_C!£_. g_ec~use there is no llmi ting principle 
that would allow the -states to criminalize incest, prostitution or any 
other "consensual" sexual activity. Moreover, it would forbid the 
states from adopting any sort of policy that would exclude homosexuals 
from class rooms or state-sponsored boys' clubs and Boy Scout adult 
leadership. 
The Eighth Amendment argument, while it avoids (at least for the 
present) the "sfiPpery slope" of the Fourteenth Amendment argument, 
creates a p~n~_<J.!_ea~r mi~QhJef. Georgia here criminalizes 
only the act of sodomy. If the act of sodomy is a "status," then what 
about the acts of ince_st, exhibi t:.ionism, ~, and drug possession. A 
drug addict must necessarily "possess" drug and can be convicted -- at 
least up to now -- for possession. In short, your argument would 
swallow up centuries of criminal law since anyone who could has a psy-
chological dependency would be entitled to carry out (at least in pri-
vate or with a consenting par~ner) whatever is necessary to satisfy 
his cravings. 
/ ~ There is no evidence that Hardwick is a "compulsive" homosexual 
c~~( so as to have even a colorable Eighth Amendment claim. See Powell v. 
vy Texas, 392 u.s. 514, 552 n.4 (1968) (WHITE, J., concurring). Homosex-
~~ · allty is obviously not the same as addiction to narcotics. By defi-
~J~ nition, one has the "status" of a narcotics addict only if one is 
Y physically compelled to take narcotics, but even that's controllable. 0 But surely homosexuals are not "sex crazed" automatons who are "com-pelled" by their "status" to gratify their sexual appetites only by ~ committing sodomy. Heterosexuals, after all, manage to live in a so-
ciety where sexual activities are often proscribed except within the 
bonds of marriage. 
The record simply does not remotely support a conclusion that 
sodomy is compulsive. Moreover, I seriously doubt whether medical 
evidence would support this notion for all or even many homosexuals. 
It is extremely unlikely that what Western Civilization has for centu-
ries viewed as a volitional, reprehensible act is, in reality, merely 
a conditioned response to which moral blame may not attach. Are those 
with an "orientation" towards rape to be let off merely because they 
allege that the act of rape is "irresistible" to them? Are we to ex-
cuse every "Jack the Ripper?" 
Hardwick merely wishes to seek his own form of sexual gratifica-
tion. Undoubtedly there are also those in society who wish seek grat-





tion, ~~, and what not7 such persons may even file complaints in 
federal court avering that they "regularly engage" in the prohibited 
acts and "will do so in the future." Complaint, in J.A., at 3. But 
that hardly establishes a basis for upholding a facial challenge to an 
otherwise valid statute. As Justice Holmes put it, "pretty much all 
law consists in forbidding men to do some things that they want to do 
" Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 u.s. 525, 568 (1923) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
April 13, an unlucky 
This case presents for me the 
~s. I hope you will excus 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:putm Qfltttd qf Ur~ 'Jitnit~~ ~hd~g 
~ulfingwn. ~. <If. 2ll.;tJ!.;? 
April 8, 1986 
Re: 85-140 - Bowers v. Hardwick 
Dear Lewis: 
Your letter, which expresses some uncertainty as 
to whether your final vote would be one to reverse or 
to affirm brings to mind the disposition of the Court 
in Coleman v. Miller, 307 u.s. 433, 446-447, where 
the Court, with all nine Justices participating, 
disposed of the question whether the Lieutenant 
Governor of Kansas was part of t a e 1 ature, 
by stating that the Court was 11 qually divide 11 on 
the issue. 




Copies to the Conference 
April 8 , 1986 
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
At Conference last week, I expressea the view that 
in some cases it would violate the Eighth Amendment to im-
prison a person for a private act of homosexual sodomy. 1 
continue to think that in such cases imprisonment would con-
stitute cruel and unusual Punishment. 1 relied primarllv on 
Robinson v . California. 
At Conference, given my view as to the Eighth 
Amendment, mv vote was to affirm but on this qroun~ rather 
than the view of four other Justic~~ that there was a viola-
tion of a fundamental substantive constitutional right - as 
CAll held. 1 did not agree that there is a ~ubstantive due 
process right to engage in conduct that for centuries has 
been recognized as deviant, and not in the best interest of 
preserving humanity . 1 may say qenerally, that 1 also hesi-
tate to create another substantive due process right. 
1 write this memorandum today because upon further 
study as to exactly what is before us, 1 conclude that my 
"bottom line" should be to reverse rather. than affirm. The 
only question presented by the parties is the substantive 
due process issue, and - as several of you noted at Confer-
ence - my Eighth Amendment view was not addressed by the 
court below or by the parties . 
In sum, my more carefully considered view is that 1 
will vote to reverse but will write separately to explain my 
view of this case qenerally . 1 will not know, until 1 see 
the writing, whether 1 can ioin an opinion finding no sub-
stantive due process right or simply join the iudqment . 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Dear Byron: 
.iUFtmt Qfcnri of tlrt~~ ,itatte 
._uJringto~ ~. (ij. 2Up)!.~ 
April 9, 1986 
85-140 - Bowers v. Hardwick 
In light of Lewis' memo of April 8th, this will serve as an 
assignment to you of the above case. A revised list will be 
along soon. 
Justice Byron White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~mtt <qourtltf tq~ ~b ~hdtg 
._,asJrin.gtMt. ~. <q. 2ll~Jl..;t 
Re: No. 85-140, Bowers v. Hardwick 
Dear Byron: 
April 21, 1986 
In due course, I shall try my hand at a dissent in 
this case. 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
'' 
•' 
~uprtm.t Clfttttrt of tlft }tnittb ~tatte 
'IIJaeltinghm, ~. elf. 2Llbi'l-~ 
CHAMeERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
April 22, 1986 
Re: No. 85-140-Bowers v. Hardwick 
Dear Byron: 





cc: The Conference 
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Apr i 1 2 2 , 1 9 8 6 
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cc: The Conference 
'. 
CHAMBERS O r 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Snprtmt <lfltltrl of tlrt ~~a .itzmg 
jiasfring~ ~. <!}. 20bi~~ 
April 23, 1986 
Re: NO. 85-140 Bowers v. Harwick 
Dear Byron, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 




TO: Mike DATE: May 21, 1986 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick 
I have now reviewed more carefully Justice 
White's opinion (third draft), and subject to 
consideration of your views think I can join his 
opinion. It is well written, and I particularly like what 
he has said about substantive due process. He even relies 
on my opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland - an 
opinion I believe Byron criticized at the time. 
I still intend to write separately relying on the 
Eighth Amendment. It is not yet entirely clear how I can 
justify writing in view of Byron's flat reversal of CAll, 
the effect of which is to sustain the validity of the 
Georgia statute. 
Even if I only join the judgment, Hardwick can be 
prosecuted and may well be in view of the publicity given 
this case. Moreover, he sought a declaratory judgment in 
view of the "threat" of prosecution. I therefore could 




Eighth Amendment - not addressed in the Court's opinion -
could be considered. 
Perhaps I should not say categorically that the 
Eighth Amendment applies in this case, as that issue is 
not before us. The substance of my opinion would be that 
the applicability of that amendment is a question 
depending on the facts developed at trial - that could be 
addressed. 
After we get your Court opinion as far as a 
Chambers draft, I suggest you put this case at the . top of 
your list. 
ss 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 
Date: June 12, 1986 
9~~~ 
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~~~J'M_~ 
~~~-~~ 
This memo discusses the problems I have with the Eighth 
Amendment theories on which you would base urrence in 
I . / ~."'-
this case, and a recommended solution. ~ ~d.e~ ~ 
r ez (~(~) 
One basis for a concurrence that you have considered is 
based on two cases, Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660 
and Powell v. Texas, 392 u.s. 514 (1968). The 
acting on a compulsion they cannot I have two problems 
with using this approach: 5' ~ ~ d"2...(_ 
S~v~ 
1. Lack of case support. In Robinson the Court merely lneid that 
a state could not make a person's status a crime, i.e., the -
status of being a drug addict. In Bowers the state is not 
attempting to criminalize the status of being a homosexual, it is 
criminalizing actual conduct. Robinson does not provide any real 
support, other than the fact that it introduced the concept of 
Eighth Amendment analysis to compulsions. In Powell, your 
concurrence would not be based on the majority opinion at all, 
which affirmed the conviction. (Majority opinion was authored by 
Justice MARSHALL; separate concurrence by Black, joined by 
. ' 
Harlan) Instead, it is based on the dissenting opinion of ~ 
Justice Fortas, combined with Justice WHITE's opinion concurring 
in the judgment. The dissenters would have excused the 
compulsion of alcoholism, plus the acting out of that compulsion 
by drinking or taking drugs. As Justice Fortas put it, criminal 
penalties may not be inflicted upon a person "for being in a 
position he is powerless to change," or if "the condition 
essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the pattern 
of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of 
the disease." Id. at 567, 569. That is, Powell could not be 
punished for being drunk, nor could he be punished for being 
drunk in public, since once he was drunk he could not control 
where he went. Justice WHITE agreed except to say that on the 
facts of Powell it appeared that he could have avoided being in 
public. 
This is an alarmingly broad principle to use as support; 
my impression is that it is not in accordance with your general 
views. 1~ 
We could, of course, limit the principle ourselves. Even 
so, this theory does not fit well into any "compulsion" analysis. 
As can be seen from Robinson and Powell, the "compulsion" cases 
involve, and depend for their validity on, the sort of compulsion 
that completely removes a person's ability to choose how he will 
act. In other words, the relevant compulsions are those that are 
strong enough so that acting on the compulsion is not a 
volitional act. There is a great deal of discussion in Powell as 
to degrees of alcoholism, so that the case, even for the 




dissenters, turned on that degree of alcoholism that completely 
controls and dominates its victim. In Bowers, the relevant 
compulsion is the human sex drive. While that drive is strong, I 
do not think that it can be compared even remotely to a 
1 ~compulsion that removes one's volition, or that dominates the 
~ will so that one is literally not accountable for one's actions. 
The drive to have sexual relations is not like heroin addiction, 
and the notion that people cannot be held accountable for their 
sexual behavior is, again, one that I suspect is not consistent 
with your views. 
2. Broad application. As can be seen from the above discussion, 
a second cause for concern with this theory is its potentially 
broad application. I will not describe this concern in any 
detail, but the main point is that it would excuse from 
accountability the acting out of any compulsion which one is 
powerless to control, including those actions outside the horne 
ich are the natural result of the compulsion and which are not 
acts of volition. The implications for drug enforcement are one 
concern, as well as the possible constitutionalization of one 
version of the insanity defense, something the Court has wisely 
declined to do many times. 
I would recommend rejecting the above argument if it were 
presented to you by another opinion writer. I certainly would 
not recommend adopting this theory in one of your own opinions. 
II 
The second Eighth Amendment theory is based on your 
decision in Solem v. Helm, 463 u.s. 277 (1983). Helm sets out a 
proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment. The case 
involved a life sentence for passing a bad check under a South 
Dakota recidivist statute. You could, in Bowers, suggest that it 
would violate the proportionality aspect of the Eighth Amendment 
to jail a man for sodomy. The only obstacle to that is that in 
Bowers no sentence has actually been imposed. In addition, 
because four Justices apparently stand ready to adopt almost any 
standard you set out if and when the next case comes up, your 
brief concurrence could wind up being a court opinion and 
committing you to a position. For that reason, if you decide to 
use the proportionality theory, I suggest leaving yourself as 
much flexibililty as possible for the future. Rather than any 
lengthy exposition, in which you attempt to distinguish a 
permissible sentence from an impermissible sentence, I suggest a 
very brief statement, no more than a paragraph, along the 
following lines: 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. I agree with the Court that 
there is no fundamental right such as the one 
respondent argues for in this case. My own view is 
that the constitutional provision that protects 
respondent is the Eighth Amendment, see Solem v. Helm, 
463 u.s. 277 (1983). Respondent has not even been 
tried, much less convicted and sentenced. Moreover, 
the parties have not raised any Eighth Amendment issue. 
For these reasons, no Eighth Amendment argument is 
before us. I would wait to decide the applicability of 
the Eighth Amendment to cases such as this one until 
such time as a sentence actually is imposed. 
The above paragraph merely announces your view that the 
Eighth Amendment applies, and the general theory by which it 
applies. It has the virtue of not "slapping down" a state in 
advance for a disproportionate sentence, when in fact no sentence 
has been imposed. In addition, I think it no accident that no 
sentence has been imposed. To the extent that your 
constitutional concern is that persons not be sent to jail for 
homosexual conduct, it is better to wait until someone actually 
is sentenced before resolving this very thorny issue. If that 
never happens, then your basic constitutional concern that people 
not be sent to jail for homosexual conduct will have been 
satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
I recommend that you join Justice WHITE's opinion, and 
circulate the concurring paragraph suggested above. 
lfp/ss 06/16/86 BOW SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mike DATE: June 16, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick 
What would you think of adding a footnote 
substantially as follows: 
It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to 
the complaint against respondents, there had been no 
prosecution since 19 ___ under Georgia's statute for sodomy 
committed in private since. Moreover, the complaint 
against respondents was dismissed by the State, and this 
is a suit for a declaratory judgment brought by 
respondents challenging the validity of this ancient 
statute. In reality, one could say there is no case or 
controversy, and that we are being asked to render an 
advisory opinion. At least, the history of non-
enforcement suggests the moribund character today of 
ancient laws criminalizing this type of private conduct. 
Some states have repealed similar statutes. But the 
constitutional validity of the Georgia statute was put in 
issue by respondents, and for the reasons stated by the 
....... 
2. 
Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of 
years has now become a fundamental right. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 06/12/86 WICK SALLY-POW 
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that there is no 
fundamental right - i.e. no substantive right under the 
Due Process Clause - such as that claimed by respondent, 
and found to exist by the Court of Appeals. This is not 
to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected 
by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. The Georgia 
statute at issue in this case authorizes a court to 
imprison one for up to 20 years for a single private act 
of sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct 
- certainly a sentence of long duration - would create a 
serious Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute 
a single act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a 
'.· 
2. 
home, is a felony comparable in terms of the possible 
sentence imposed for serious felonies such as -------
and ------- {Here, Mike, perhaps a footnote also 
could be added based on the library's providing detailed 
information as to felony statutes in other states for 
sodomy) • 
In this case, however, respondent has not been 
tried, much less convicted and sentenced. Moreover, as 
respondent has not raised an Eighth Amendment issue, this 
constitutional argument is not before us. The 
applicability of the Eighth Amendment to cases such as 
this arises only when a prison sentence is imposed. 
* * * 
Mike, possibly add a footnote generally to effect 
that a serious question considered by the legislative 
3. 
bodies of other states is whether other than centuries of 
history, there is a present day justification for making 
an act of sodomy a felony in the same general category as 
major crimes against persons and property. There is, of 
course, a substantial if not a compelling state interest 
in assuring the continued existence over the centuries 
ahead of the human race. Sodomy, a form of sexual 
gratification unrelated to family and children, may not 
have any redeeming societal purpose. But whatever may be 
said in this respect, a serious question exists, apart 
from constitutionality, whether statutes that criminalize 
acts of sodomy that rarely are or can be enforced, serve 
any purpose. 
~-
lfp/ss 06/13/86 WICK SALLY-POW 
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that there is no 
fundamental right - i.e. no substantive right under the 
Due Process Clause - such as that claimed by respondent, 
and found to exist by the Court of Appeals. This is not 
to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected 
by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. The Georgia 
statute at issue in this case, Ga. Code Ann. §16-6-2, 
authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years 
for a single private, consensual act of sodomy. In my 
view, a prison sentence for such conduct - certainly a 
sentence of long duration - would create a serious Eighth 
Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act 
2. 
of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a 
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence 
imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, 
§16-5-24, first degree arson, §16-7-60 and robbery, §16-8-
40.1 
In this case, however, respondent has not been 
tried, much less convicted and sentenced. Moreover, as 
respondent has not raised an Eighth Amendment issue, this 
lAmong those states that continue to make sodomy a crime, 
Georgia authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See 
Ala. Code §13A-6-65 (a) (3) (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§13-1411, 13-
1412 (1978); Ark. Stat. §41-1813 (1975); D.C. Code §22-3052 
(1981); Fla. Stat. §800.02 (1984); Ga. Code §16-6-2 (1982); Idaho 
Code §18-6605 (1979); Kan. Stat. §21-3505 (1974); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
§510.100 (1975); La. Rev. Stat. §§14:89.1 (1982); Md. Code art. 
27, §§553-54 (Supp. 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws §§750.158, 750.338, 
750.388(a)-(b) (1981); Minn. Stat. §609.293 (Supp. 1982); Miss. 
Code §97-29-59 (1972); Mo. Stat. §566.090 (Vernon 1982); Mont. 
Code §45-5-505 (1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.190 (1979); N.C. Gen. 
Stat . § 14 -17 7 ( 19 81) ; 0 k 1 a . Stat . tit. 21 , § 8 8 6 ( 19 8 3 ) ; R. I. Gen. 
Laws §11-10-1 (1981); S.C. Code §16-15-120 (1977); Tenn. Code 
§39-2-612 (1982); Tex. Penal Code §21.06 (Vernon 1974); Utah Code 
§76-5-403 (1983); Va. Code §18.2-361 (1982). 
3. 
constitutional argument is not before us. The 
applicability of the Eighth Amendment to cases such as 
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BOWF SALLY-POW ~ 
The dissent relies on the plurality opinion that 
) I/- 'J J U-_ .1 v 'Iff. (} 1 .., 7) J 
I wrote in Moore v. East Cleveland to reason that the 
1 
Court today closes its eyes "to the basic reasons why 
certain rights associated with the family have been 
accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause." Id. , at,...50 1: I find it more than a 
little curious to cite, much less analogize, Moore's focus 
on the importance of the "family" to the conduct of sodomy 
in private. The fundamental reason for the condemnation 
of sodomy has been its antithesis to family. The 
preservation of civilization depends upon the family and 
the bearing of children • 
. . . 








From: Justice Powell 
1 Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-140 
MICHAEL J . BOWERS, A'ITORNEY GENERAL OF 
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK, 
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE 
• ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental right-
i. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clause-
such as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the 
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that re-
spondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of 
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in this case, 
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a per-
son for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of 
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct-
certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious 
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a sin-
gle act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a 
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed 
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, 
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1 
' Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia 
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code 
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813 
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code§ 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to 
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100 
85-140-CONCUR 
2 BOWERS v. HARDWICK 
In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much 
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has 
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these 
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us. 
(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp. 
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year 
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum), 
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1-
year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum); 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6-
year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year max-
imum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum). 
2 It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against 
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving pros-
ecution for homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades. 
See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). Moreover, 
the State has declined to present the criminal proceeding to a grand jury, 
and this is a suit for declaratory judgment brought by respondents chal-
lenging the validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement sug-
gests the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of pri-
vate, consensual conduct. Some 26 states have repealed similar statutes. 
But the constitutional validity of the Georgia statute was put in issue by 
respondents, and for the reasons stated by the Court, I cannot say that 
conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a fundamental 
right. 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
lhlJ~ u •t9f; t. Recirculated:_ .. ________ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-140 
MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK, 
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental right-
i. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clause-
such as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the 
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that re-
spondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of 
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in ·this case, 
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a per-
son for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of 
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct-
certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious 
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a sin-
gle act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a 
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed 
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, 
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1 
'Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia 
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code 
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813 
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to 
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100 
85-140--CONCUR 
2 BOWERS v. HARDWICK 
In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much 
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has 
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these 
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us. 
(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp. 
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year 
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum), 
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1-
year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum); 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6-
year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21 , § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year max-
imum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum). 
2 It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against 
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving pros-
ecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several dec- l 
ades. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). 
Moreover, the State has declined to present the criminal charge against I 
Hardwick to a grand jury, and this is a suit for declaratory judgment 
brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The his-
tory of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws 
criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states 
have repealed similar statutes. But the constitutional validity of the 
Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons 
stated by the Court , I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of 
years has now become a fundamental right. 
' .. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White (/ 
Justice Marshall '-/ ~. . • 




From: Justice Blackmun 
Circulated: JUN ~ i1 1~86 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT / 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-140 
MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK, ___ _, ~ 
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE ~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF L./. 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ..... ~ 
[June -, 1986] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage 
in homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, 
ante, at 4, than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), was 
about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz 
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967) , was about a funda-
mental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. 
Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, "the 
right to be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J . , dissenting). 
The statute at issue, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, denies indi-
viduals the right to decide for themselves whether to engage 
in particular forms of private, consensual sexual activity. 
The Court concludes that§ 16-6-2 is valid essentially because 
"the laws of ... many States ... still make such conduct ille-
gal and have done so for a very long time." Ante, at 3. But 
the fact that the moral judgments expressed by statutes like 
§ 16-6-2 may be "natural and familiar ... ought not to con-
clude our judgment upon the question whether statutes em-
bodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United 
States." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 117 (1973), quoting 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J. , 
dissenting). Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "[i]t is re-
-~~I --=--.. ..--~....._~-----
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volting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so 
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). I believe we must analyze 
respondent's claim in the light of the values that underlie the 
constitutional right to privacy. If that right means any-
thing, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens 
for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their 
lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have 
made is an "'abominable crime not fit to be named among 
Christians."' Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 721, 46 S. E. 
876, 882 (1904). 
I 
In its haste to reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that 
the Constitution does not "confe[r] a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy," ante, at 3, the Court 
relegates the actual statute being challenged to a footnote 
and ignores the procedural posture of the case before it. A 
fair reading of the statute and of the complaint clearly reveals 
that the majority has distorted the question this case 
presents. 
First, the Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual 
activity is particularly hard to justify in light of the broad 
language Georgia has used. Unlike the Court, the Georgia 
Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homo-
sexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives 
may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it 
limited the choices of those other citizens. Cf. ante, at 2, 
n. 2. Rather, Georgia has provided that "[a] person commits 
the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any 
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the 
mouth or anus of another." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2(a). 
The sex or status of the persons who engage in the act is 
irrelevant as a matter of state law. In fact, to the extent I 
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can discern a legislative purpose for Georgia's 1968 enact-
ment of§ 16-6-2, that purpose seems to have been to broaden 
the coverage of the law to reach heterosexual as well as ho-
mosexual activity. 1 I therefore see no basis for the Court's 
decision to treat this case as an "as applied" challenge to 
§ 16-6-2, see ante, at 2, n. 2, or for Georgia's attempt, both in 
its brief and at oral argument, to defend § 16-6-2 solely on 
the grounds that it prohibits homosexual activity. Michael 
Hardwick's standing may rest in significant part on Georgia's 
apparent willingness to enforce against homosexuals a law it 
seems not to have any desire to enforce against heterosex-
uals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5; cf. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 
F. 2d 1202, 1205-1206 (CAll 1985). But his claim that 
§ 16-6-2 involves an unconstitutional intrusion into his pri-
vacy and his right of intimate association does not depend in 
any way on his sexual orientation. 
Second, I disagree with the Court's refusal to consider 
whether § 16-6-2 runs afoul of the Eighth or Ninth Amend-
ments or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Ante, at 9, n. 8. Respondent's complaint ex-
pressly invoked the Ninth Amendment, see App. 6, and he 
relied heavily before this Court on Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965), which identifies that Amendment 
as one of the specific constitutional provisions giving "life and 
substance" to our understanding of privacy. See Brief for 
Respondent 10-12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. More importantly, 
the procedural posture of the case requires that we affirm the 
'Until1968, Georgia defined sodomy as "the carnal knowledge and con-
nection against the order of nature, by man with man, or in the same un-
natural manner with woman." Ga. Crim. Code § 26-5901 (1933). In 
Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939), the Georgia 
Supreme Court held that§ 26-5901 did not prohibit lesbian activity. And 
in Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga. 345, 133 S. E. 2d 367 (1963), the Georgia 
Supreme Court held that § 26-5901 did not prohibit heterosexual cunnilin-
gus. Georgia passed the act-specific statute currently in force "perhaps in 
response to the restrictive court decisions such as Riley," Note, The 
Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. Pub. L. 159, 167, n. 47 (1967). 
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Court of Appeals' judgment if there is any ground on which 
respondent may be entitled to relief. This case is before us 
on petitioner's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). See App. 17. It is a well set-
tled principle of law that "a complaint should not be dismissed 
merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the 
particular legal theory he advances, for the court is under a 
duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations 
provide for relief on any possible theory." Bramlet v. Wil-
son, 495 F. 2d 714, 716 (CAB 1974); see Parr v. Great Lakes 
Express Co., 484 F. 2d 767, 773 (CA71973); Due v. Tallahas-
see Theatres, Inc., 333 F. 2d 630, 631 (CA5 1964); United 
States v. Howell, 318 F. 2d 162, 166 (CA9 1963); 5 C. Wright 
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1357, 
pp. 601-602 (1969); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 
45-46 (1957). Thus, even if respondent did not advance 
claims based on the Eighth or Ninth Amendments, or on the 
Equal Protection Clause, his complaint should not be dis-
missed if any of those provisions could entitle him to relief. I 
need not reach either the Eighth Amendment or the Equal 
Protection Clause issues because I believe that Hardwick has 
stated a cognizable claim that § 16-6-2 interferes with con-
stitutionally protected interests in privacy and freedom of 
intimate association. But neither the Eighth Amendment 
nor the Equal Protection Clause is so clearly irrelevant that a 
claim resting on either provision should be peremptorily dis-
missed. 2 The Court's cramped reading of the issue before it 
2 In Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962), the Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment barred convicting a defendant due to his "status" 
as a narcotics addict, since that condition was "apparently an illness which 
may be contracted innocently or involuntarily." ld., at 667. In Powell v. 
Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968), where the Court refused to extend Robinson 
to punishment of public drunkenness by a chronic alcoholic, one of the fac-
tors relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL, in writing the plurality opinion, was 
that Texas had not "attempted to regulate appellant's behavior in the pri-
vacy of his own home." Id., at 532. JUSTICE WHITE wrote separately: 
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makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a per-
suasive one. 
II 
"Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution em-
bodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual 
"Analysis of this difficult case is not advanced by preoccupation with the 
label 'condition.' In Robinson the Court dealt with 'a statute which makes 
the "status" of narcotic addition a criminal offense ... .' 370 U. S., at 
666. By precluding criminal conviction for such a 'status' the Court was 
dealing with a condition brought about by acts remote in time from the 
application of the criminal sanctions contemplated, a condition which was 
relatively permanent in duration, and a condition of great magnitude and 
significance in terms of human behavior and values. . . . If it were neces-
sary to distinguish between 'acts' and 'conditions' for purposes of the 
Eighth Amendment, I would adhere to the concept of 'condition' implicit in 
the opinion in Robinson . . . . The proper subject of inquiry is whether 
volitional acts brought about the 'condition' and whether those acts are suf-
ficiently proximate to the 'condition' for it to be permissible to impose penal 
sanctions on the 'condition.'" !d., at 550-551, n. 2. 
Despite historical views of homosexuality, it is no longer viewed by men-
tal health professionals as a "disease" or disorder. See Brief for American 
Psychological Association and American Public Health Association as 
Amici Curiae 8-11. But, obviously, neither is it simply a matter of delib-
erate personal election. Homosexual orientation may well form part of 
the very fiber of an individual's personality. Consequently, under Jus-
TICE WHITE's analysis in Powell, the Eighth Amendment may pose a con-
stitutional barrier to sending an individual to prison for acting on that at-
traction regardless of the circumstances. An individual's ability to make 
constitutionally protected "decisions concerning sexual relations," Carey v. 
Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 711 (1977) (POWELL, J. , 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), is rendered empty in-
deed if he or she is given no real choice but a life without any physical 
intimacy. 
With respect to the Equal Protection Clause's applicability to § 16-6-2, I 
note that Georgia's exclusive stress before this Court on its interest in 
prosecuting homosexual activity despite the gender-neutral terms of the 
statute may raise serious questions of discriminatory enforcement, ques-
tions that cannot be disposed of before this Court on a motion to dismiss. 
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373-374 (1886). The legislature 
having decided that the sex of the participants is irrelevant to the legality 
of the acts, I do not see why the State can defend § 16-6-2 on the ground 
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liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government." 
Thornburgh v. American Call. of Obst. & Gyn., -- U. S. 
--, -- (1986) (slip op. 23). In construing the right to pri-
vacy, the Court has proceeded along two somewhat distinct, 
albeit complementary, lines. First, it has recognized a pri-
vacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are 
properly for the individual to make. E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113 (1973); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 
(1925). Second, it has recognized a privacy interest with 
reference to certain places without regard for the particular 
activities in which the individuals who occupy them are en-
gaged. E. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 (1984); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Rios v. United 
States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960). The case before us implicates 
both the decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to 
privacy. 
A 
The Court concludes today that none of our prior cases 
dealing with various decisions that individuals are entitled to 
make free of governmental interference "bears any resem-
blance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to 
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case." 
Ante, at 4. While it is true that these cases may be charac-
terized by their connection to protection of the family, see 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 619 (1984), 
the Court's conclusion that they extend no further than this 
boundary ignores the warning in Moore v. East Cleveland, 
431 U. S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality opinion), against "clos-
that individuals singled out for prosecution are of the same sex as their 
partners. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, a claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause may well be available without having to reach the 
more controversial question whether homosexuals are a suspect class. 
See, e. g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,- U. S. -, 
- (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Note, The 
Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect 
Classification, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 (1985). 
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[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associ-
ated with the~ have been accorded shelter under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." We protect 
those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and 
material way, to the general public welfare, but because they 
form so cent ala pa an · div· ' life. "[T]he concept 
of privacy em odies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to 
himself and not others nor to society as a whole.'" Thorn-
burgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., -- U. S., at 
--, n. 5 (STEVENS, J., concurring) (slip op. 6, n. 5), quoting 
Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 288-289 
(1977). And so we protect the decision whether to marry 
precisely because marriage "is an association that promotes a 
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 486. We protect the 
decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so 
dramatically an individual's self-definition, not because of 
demographic considerations or the Bible's command to be 
fruitful and multiply. Cf. Thornburgh v. American Coll. of 
Obst. & Gyn., supra, at--, n. 6 (STEVENS, J., concurring) 
(slip op. 6, n. 6). And we pr_otect the family because it 
contributes so powerfully to the liappiness of individuals, not 
because of a preference for stereotypical households. Cf. 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S., at 500-506 (plurality 
OprrUon). The Court recognized in Roberts, 468 U. S., at 
619, that the "ability independently to define one's identity 
that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exer-
cised in a vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrich-
ment of close ties with others." Ibid. 
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that 
sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human ex-
istence, central to family life, community welfare, and the 
development of human personality," Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slayton, 413 U. S. 49, 63 (1973); see also Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 685 (1977). The 
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fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way 
through their intimate sexual relationships with others sug-
gests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many 
"right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much 
of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom 
an individual has to choose the form and nature of these 
intensely personal bonds. See Karst, The Freedom of Inti-
mate Association, 89 Yale L. J. 624, 637 (1980); cf. 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U. 8., at 153. 
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a 
necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose 
how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that differ-
ent individuals will make different choices. For example, in 
holding that the clearly important state interest in public 
education should give way to a competing claim by the Amish 
to the effect that extended formal schooling threatened their 
way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no assumption 
that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like 
them are 'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even erratic 
but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be 
condemned because it is different." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U. S. 205, 223-224 (1972). The Court claims that its decision 
today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has re-
fused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals 
have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations 
with others. 
B 
The behavior for which Hardwick faces prosecution oc-
curred in his own home, a place to which the Fourth Amend-
ment attaches special significance. The Court's treatment of 
this aspect of the case is symptomatic of its overall refusal to 
consider the broad principles that have informed our treat-
ment of privacy in specific cases. Just as the right to privacy 
is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitle-
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ments to engage in specific behavior, so too, protecting the 
physical integrity of the home is more than merely a means of 
protecting specific activities that often take place there. 
Even when our understanding of the contours of the right to 
privacy depends on "reference to a 'place,"' Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), "the es-
sence of a Fourth Amendment violation is 'not the breaking 
of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,' but 
rather is 'the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal se-
curity, personal liberty and private property."' California 
v. Ciraolo, -- U. S. --, -- (1986) (POWELL, J., dis-
senting) (slip op. 11), quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 
u. s. 616, 630 (1886). 
The Court's interpretation of the pivotal case of Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), is entirely unconvincing. 
Stanley held that Georgia's undoubted power to punish the 
public distribution of constitutionally unprotected, obscene 
material did not permit the State to punish the private pos-
session of such material. According to the majority here, 
Stanley relied entirely on the First Amendment, and thus, it 
is claimed, sheds no light on cases not involving printed 
materials. Ante, at 8. But that is not what Stanley said. 
Rather, the Stanley Court anchored its holding in the Fourth 
Amendment's special protection for the individual in his 
home: 
"'The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They 
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of 
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to 
be found in material things. They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations.' 
"These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the 
case before us. He is asserting the right to read or ob-
10 
85-140---DISSENT 
BOWERS v. HARDWICK 
serve what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellec-
tual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own 
home." Id., at 564-565, quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U. S., at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
The central place that Stanley gives Justice Brandeis' dis-
sent in Olmstead, a case raising no First Amendment claim, 
shows that Stanley rested as much on the Court's under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment as it did on the First. 
Indeed, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 
(1973), the Court suggested that reliance on the Fourth 
Amendment not only supported the Court's outcome in Stan-
ley but actually was necessary to it: "If obscene material un-
protected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a 
'penumbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court 
would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the 
narrow basis of the 'privacy of the home,' which was hardly 
more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.'" 
I d., at 66. "The right of the people to be secure in their ... 
houses," expressly guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, is 
perhaps the most "textual" of the various constitutional pro-
visions that inform our understanding of the right to privacy, 
and thus I cannot agree with the Court's statement that 
"[t]he right pressed upon us here has no ... support in the 
text of the Constitution," ante, at 8. Indeed, the right of an 
individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of 
his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Con-
stitution's protection of privacy. 
III 
The Court's failure to comprehend the magnitude of the 
liberty interests at stake in this case leads it to slight the 
question whether petitioner, on behalf of the State, has justi-
fied Georgia's infringement on these interests. I believe 
that neither of the two general justifications for§ 16-6-2 that 
petitioner has advanced warrants dismissing respondent's 
challenge for failure to state a claim. 
' . 
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First, petitioner asserts that the acts made criminal by the 
statute may have serious adverse consequences for "the gen-
eral public health and welfare," such as spreading communi-
cable diseases or fostering other criminal activity. Brief for 
Petitioner 37. Inasmuch as this case was dismissed by the 
District Court on the pleadings, it is not surprising that the 
record before us is barren of any evidence to support peti-
tioner's claim. 3 In light of the state of the record, I see no 
justification for the . Court's attempt to equate the private, 
consensual sexual activity at issue here with the "possession 
in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods," ante, at 9, to 
which Stanley refused to extend its protection. 394 U. S., 
at 568, n. 11. None of the behavior so mentioned in Stanley 
can properly be viewed as "[v]ictimless," ante, at 9: drugs 
and weapons are inherently dangerous, see, e. g., 
McLaughlin v. United States,-- U. S. -- (1986), and for 
property to be "stolen," someone must have been wrongfully 
deprived of it. Nothing in the record before the Court pro-
vides any justification for finding the activity forbidden by 
§ 16-6-2 to be physically dangerous, either to the persons en-
gaged in it or to others. 4 
3 Even if a court faced with a challenge to § 16-6-2 were to apply simple 
rational-basis scrutiny to the statute, Georgia would be required to show 
an actual connection between the forbidden acts and the ill effects it seeks 
to prevent. The connection between the acts prohibited by § 16-6-2 and 
the harms identified by petitioner in his brief before this Court is a subject 
of hot dispute, hardly amenable to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). Compare, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 36-37 and Brief 
for David Robinson, Jr., as Amicus Curiae 23-28, on the one hand, with 
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y. 2d 476, 489, 415 N. E. 2d 936, 941 (1980); Brief 
for the Attorney General of the State of New York, joined by the Attorney 
General of the State of California, as Amici Curiae 11-14; and Brief for the 
American Psychological Association and American Public Health Associa-
tion as Amici Curiae 19-27, on the other. 
'Although I do not think it necessary to decide today issues that are not 
even remotely before us, it does seem to me that a court could find simple, 
analytically sound distinctions between certain private, consensual sexual 
conduct, on the one hand, and adultery and incest (the only two vaguely 
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The core of petitioner's defense of § 16-6-2, however, is 
that respondent and others who engage in the conduct pro-
hibited by § 16-6-2 interfere with Georgia's exercise of the 
"'right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent 
society,'" Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S., at 
59-60, quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 199 (1964) 
(Warren, C. J., dissenting). Essentially, petitioner argues, 
and the Court agrees, that the fact that the acts described in 
§ 16-6-2 "for hundreds of years, if not thousands, have been 
uniformly condemned as immoral" is a sufficient reason to 
permit a State to ban them today. Brief for Petitioner 19; 
see ante, at 3, 5-8, 9. 
I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has 
held its convictions or the passions with which it defends 
them can withdraw legislation from this Court's scrutiny. 
See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U. S. 483 (1954). 5 As Justice Jackson wrote so eloquently 
specific "sexual crimes" to which the majority points, ante, at 9), on the 
other. For example, marriage, in addition to its spiritual aspects, is a civil 
contract that entitles the contracting parties to a variety of governmentally 
provided benefits. A State might define the contractual commitment nec-
essary to become eligible for these benefits to include a commitment of fi-
delity and then punish individuals for breaching that contract. Moreover, 
a State might conclude that adultery is likely to injure third persons, in 
particular, spouses and children of persons who engage in extramarital af-
fairs. With respect to incest, a court might well agree with respondent 
that the nature of familial relationships renders true consent to incestuous 
activity sufficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition of such activity 
is warranted. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. Notably, the Court makes no 
effort to explain why it has chosen to group private, consensual homosex-
ual activity with adultery and incest rather than with private, consensual 
heterosexual activity by unmarried persons or, indeed, with oral or anal 
sex within marriage. 
' The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny. There, 
too, the State relied on a religious justification for its law. Compare 388 
U. S., at 3 (quoting trial court's statement that "Almighty God created the 
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate 
continents. . . . The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not 
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for the Court in West Virginia Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, 319 U. S. 624, 641-642 (1943), "we apply the limita-
tions of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be in-
tellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will 
disintegrate the social organization. . . . [F]reedom to differ 
is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would 
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is 
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the ex-
isting order." See also Karst, 89 Yale L. J. , at 627. It is 
precisely because the issue raised by this case touches the 
heart of what makes individuals what they are that we should 
be especially sensitive to the rights of those whose choices 
upset the majority. 
The assertion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values pro-
scribe" the conduct involved, Brief for Petitioner 20, cannot 
provide an adequate justification for § 16-6-2. That certain, 
but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior 
at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments 
on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation 
depends instead on whether the State can advance some jus-
tification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doc-
intend for the races to mix"), with Brief for Petitioner 20-21 (relying on the 
Old and New Testaments and the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas to show 
that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe such conduct"). There, 
too, defenders of the challenged statute relied heavily on the fact that when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, most of the States had similar 
prohibitions. Compare Brief for Appellee in Loving v. Virginia, 0. T. 
1966, No. 395, pp. 28-29, with ante, at 5-7 and n. 6. There, too, at the 
time the case came before the Court, many of the States still had criminal 
statutes concerning the conduct at issue. Compare 388 U. S. , at 6, n. 5 
(noting that 16 States still outlawed interracial marriage) , with ante, 6-7 
(noting that 24 States and the District of Columbia have sodomy statutes). 
Yet the Court held, not only that the individious racism of Virginia's law 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, see 388 U. S. , at 7-12, but also that 
the law deprived the Lovings of due process by denying them the "freedom 
of choice to marry" that had "long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. " 
Id. , at 12. 
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trine. See, e. g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 
429-453 (1961); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). Thus, 
far from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of Le-
viticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's hereti-
cal status during the Middle Ages undermines his suggestion 
that § 16-6-2 represents a legitimate use of secular coercive 
power. 6 A State can no more punish private behavior be-
cause of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior 
because of racial animus. "The Constitution cannot control 
such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them. Private 
biases may be 'outside the reach of the law, but the law can-
not, directly or indirectly give them effect." Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 433 (1984). No matter how uncomfort-
able a certain group may make the majority of this Court, we 
have held that "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot 
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical 
liberty." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 575 (1975). 
See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, --
U. S. -- (1985); U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 
u. s. 528, 534 (1973). 
Nor can § 16-6-2 be justified as a "morally neutral" exer-
cise of Georgia's power to "protect the public environment," 
Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U. S., at 68-69. Certainly, some 
•The theological nature of the origin of Anglo-American antisodomy 
statutes is patent. It was not until 1533 that sodomy was made a secular 
offense in England. 25 Hen. VIII, cap. 6. Until that time, the offense 
was, in Sir James Stephen's words, "merely ecclesiastical." 2 J . Stephen, 
A History of the Criminal Law of England 430 (1883). Pollock and Mait-
land similarly observed that "[t]he crime against nature . . . . was so 
closely connected with heresy that the vulgar had but one name for both." 
2 F . Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 554 (1895). The 
transfer of jurisdiction over prosecutions for sodomy to the secular courts 
seems primarily due to the alteration of ecclesiastical jurisdiction attendant 
on England's break with the Roman Catholic Church, rather than to any 
new understanding of the sovereign's interest in preventing or punishing 
the behavior involved. Cf. E. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of 
the Laws of England, ch. 10 (4th ed. 1797). 
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private behavior can affect the fabric of society as a whole. 
Reasonable people may differ about whether particular sex-
ual acts are moral or immoral, but "we have ample evidence 
for believing that people will not abandon morality, will not 
think any better of murder, cruelty and dishonesty, merely 
because some private sexual practice which they abominate is 
not punished by the law." H. L. A. Hart, Immorality and 
Treason; reprinted in The Law as Literature 220, 225 (L. 
Blom-Cooper ed. 1961). Petitioner and the Court fail to see 
the difference between laws that protect public sensibilities 
and those that enforce private morality. Statutes banning 
public sexual activity are entirely consistent with protecting 
the individual's liberty interest in decisions concerning sexual 
relations: the same recognition that those decisions are in-
tensely private which justifies protecting them from govern-
mental interference can justify protecting individuals from 
unwilling exposure to the sexual activities of others. But 
the mere fact that intimate behavior may be punished when it 
takes place in public cannot dictate how States can regulate 
intimate behavior that occurs in intimate places. See Paris 
Adult Theatre I, supra, at 66, n. 13 ("marital intercourse on a 
street corner or a theater stage" can be forbidden despite the 
constitutional protection identified in Griswold v. C onnecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 7 
7 At oral argument a suggestion appeared that, while the Fourth 
Amendment's special protection of the home might prevent the State from 
enforcing § 16-6-2 against individuals who engage in consensual sexual ac-
tivity there, that protection would not make the statute invalid. See Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 10-11. The suggestion misses the point entirely. If the law 
is not invalid, then the police can invade the home to enforce it, provided, 
of course, that they obtain a determination of probable cause from a neutral 
magistrate. One of the reasons for the Court's holding in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), was precisely the possibility, and repug-
nancy, of permitting searches to obtain evidence regarding the use of con-
traceptives. I d., at 485-486. Permitting the kinds of searches that might 
be necessary to obtain evidence of the sexual activity banned by § 16-6-2 
seems no less intrusive, or repugnant. Cf. Winston v. Lee, -- U. S. 
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This case involves no real interference with the rights of 
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not 
adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable 
interest, cf. Diamond v. Charles, -- U.S. --, --
(1986) (slip op. 10-11), let alone an interest that can justify 
invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose 
to live their lives differently. 
IV 
It took but three years for the Court to see the error in its 
analysis in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 
586 (1940), and to recognize that the threat to national co-
hesion posed by a refusal to salute the flag was vastly out-
weighed by the threat to those same values posed by compel-
ling such a salute. See West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). I can only hope that here, 
too, the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude 
that depriving individuals of the right to choose for them-
selves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far 
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our 
Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever 
do. Because I think the Court today betrays those values, I 
dissent. 
- (1985); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F. 2d 1263, 1274 (CA7 
1983). 
:; 
lfp/ss 06/24/86 Bowers - Possible footnote 
'~ 
HARD SALLY-POW 
The dissent, in finding a 
right to engage in private sodomy, relies on my plurality 
opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 u.s., 494 (1977). 
In that case, the plurality found that our decisions 
"establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of 
the family precisely because the institutions of the 
family are deeply rooted in this nation's history and 
tradition." Id., at 503. 
I find it more than a little curious to cite, 
much less analogize, Moore's focus on the "sanctity of the 
family" with sodomy. Nor can it be contended that the 
practice of sodomy is "deeply rooted in our history and 
2. 
tradition". Indeed, the reason for the condemnation of 
sodomy has been its antithesis to family. 
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MICHAEL J. BOWERS, A'ITORNEY GENERAL OF 
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK, 
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE 
• ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental right-
i. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clause-
such as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the 
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that re-
spondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of 
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in this case, 
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a per-
son for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of 
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct-
certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious 
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a sin-
gle act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a 
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed 
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, 
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1 
'Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia 
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code 
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813 
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to 
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100 
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In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much 
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has 
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these 
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us. 
(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp. 
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year 
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum), 
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1-
year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum); 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6-
year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year max-
imum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum). 
2 It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against 
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving pros-
ecution for homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades. 
See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). Moreover, 
the State has declined to present the criminal proceeding to a grand jury, 
and this is a suit for declaratory judgment brought by respondents chal-
lenging the validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement sug-
gests the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of pri-
vate, consensual conduct. Some 26 states have repealed similar statutes. 
But the constitutional validity of the Georgia statute was put in issue by 
respondents, and for the reasons stated by the Court, I cannot say that 
conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a fundamental 
right. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental right-
i. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clause-
such as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the 
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that re-
spondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of 
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in this case, 
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a per-
son for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of 
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct-
certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious 
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a sin-
gle act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a 
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed 
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, 
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1 
1 Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia 
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code 
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813 
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to 
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100 
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In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much 
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has 
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these 
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us. 
(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp. 
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year 
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum), 
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1-
year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum); 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6-
year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year max-
imum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2- 361 (1982) (5-year maximum). 
2 It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against 
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving pros-
ecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several dec- l 
ades. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). 
Moreover, the State has declined to present the criminal charge against I 
Hardwick to a grand jury, and this is a suit for declaratory judgment 
brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The his-
tory of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws 
criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states 
have repealed similar statutes. But the constitutional validity of the 
Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons 
stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of 
years has now become a fundamental right. 
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MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK, 
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court. I agree with the Court t 
that there is no fundamental right-i. e., no substantive right 
under the Due Process Clause-such as that claimed by re-
spondent, and found to exist by the Court of Appeals. This 
is not to suggest, however, that respondent may not be pro-
tected by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. The 
Georgia statute at issue in this case, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, 
authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for 
a single private, consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a 
prison sentence for such conduct-certainly a sentence of 
long duration-would create a serious Eighth Amendment 
issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, 
even in the private setting of a home, is a felony comparable 
in terms of the possible sentence imposed to serious felonies 
such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, first degree arson, 
§ 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1 
1 Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia 
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code 
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813 
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to 
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
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In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much 
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has 
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these 
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us. 
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100 
(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp. 
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year 
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum), 
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) 
(1-year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum); 
Mo. Rev. Stat . . § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) 
(6-year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum); 
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code § 16-15- 120 (1985) (5-year 
maximum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum). 
2 It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against 
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving pros-
ecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several dec-
ades. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). 
Moreover, the State has declined to present the criminal charge against 
Hardwick to a grand jury, and this is a suit for declaratory judgment 
brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The his-
tory of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws 
criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states 
have repealed similar statutes. But the constitutional validity of the 
Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons 
stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of 
years has now become a fundamental right. 
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THE BURGER COURT 
The retirement of Chief Justice Burger has prompted the 
media and legal scholars to look back on the 17 years he 
served as Chief, and to make comparisons with the years of 
Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice. I have served for 
14Y:! of the Burger Court years. P~rhaps my view of the two 
Courts may be of interest. In a luncheon talk, of course, I 
can do little more than generalize and cite to a few of the 
leading cases. 
When describing judicial decisions, I do not like to use the 
political labels "liberal" and "conservative." Apart from the 
fact that a judge may take what is considered a liberal posi-
tion on some areas of the law and a conservative one on oth-
ers, I believe that most judges-Federal and State-try con-
scientiously to obey their oath of office, and to put behind 
them partisan and social predilections. But it is a common 
practice for Presidents to make their judicial appointments 
based on their perception of the appointees' political views. 
This practice was followed by the Presidents who appointed 
members of the Burger Court. 
President Nixon, sensing substantial public displeasure 
with Warren Court decisions on criminal procedure, an-
nounced his intention to appoint conservatives. This also 
was a goal of Presidents Ford and Reagan. These three Re-
publican Presidents appointed six members of the Court over 
which Warren Burger presided. But it is clear from the his-
tory of the Court, and certainly that of both the Warren and 
Burger Courts, that Presidents frequently are disappointed 
in the performance of their appointees. However one de-
fines the term "conservative," there has been no conservative 
counterrevolution by the Burger Court. 
Criminal Procedure 
Perhaps the highest expectation of the Presidents who 
appointed the Burger Court majority was that their appoin-
tees would vote to overrule the criminal procedure decisions 
of the Warren Court. The names of many of those decisions 
are well known, among them Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 
(1961), Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and, 
of course, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 
2 
These were the doctrinal pillars of the Warren Court's 
criminal procedure jurisprudence. The Burger Court over-
ruled none of these decisions. Indeed, in recent years 
Miranda has become a household term, though members of 
the public probably use it with less than full understanding. 
Perhaps you have heard the story of the woman whose son 
was a professor of law and who occasionally commented to 
him about the law. Mter Ernesto Miranda was killed in a 
• barroom brawl over a card game, the mother sent her son a 
copy of the newspaper clipping concerning Miranda's death. 
On the bottom she wrote: "Charles, after all he did for us, 
isn't this a shame!" Whatever one's view of Miranda, the 
decision has a symbolic quality that extends far beyond its 
practical impact upon police interrogation methods. 
It is fair to say that some decisions of the Burger Court 
have limited Miranda. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 
222 (1971), for example, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Burger, the Court held that statements inadmissable in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief because of defective Miranda 
warnings nevertheless could be used to impeach the defend-
ant's credibility if he chose to take the stand. 
More recently, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 
(1984), the Court recognized a narrow public safety exception 
to the Miranda rule. In that case, officers arrested a sus-
pect in a crowded supermarket. When an officer noticed 
that the suspect wore an empty shoulder holster, he asked 
the suspect, without first giving Miranda warnings, where 
he had hidden the gun. We held that the suspect's response 
and the gun were admissible in evidence because the need to 
protect the public safety outweighed the need for Miranda 
warnings. 
The Burger Court also was called upon to define the terms 
used in the Miranda standard and thus to clarify the extent 
of the protections the decision afforded. In Rhode Island v. 
3 
Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980), for example, the Court defined 
the meaning of "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda, 
holding that warnings are required "whenever a person in 
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its func-
tional equivalent." Id., at 300-301. While that legal defi-
nition appears fairly generous, the Court went on to apply 
it cautiously, concluding that the respondent in Innis had 
not been "interrogated." Similarly, the Burger Court pro-
vided a test for deciding when a suspect is "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes. See, e. g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 
U. S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). 
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), the Burger 
Court expanded the protections afforded by Miranda. 
Under the Edwards rule, whenever a suspect invokes his 
Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during custo-
dial interrogation, the police are not free to resume question-
ing until counsel has been made available, unless the suspect 
himself initiates further conversations with the police. 1 
An important Sixth Amendment decision of the Warren 
Court was Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). 
M assiah held that, once a suspect's Sixth Amendment rights 
attach, police may not deliberately elicit incriminating state-
ments from him in the absence of his lawyer. This decision 
had enormous practical implications for police investigation 
techniques. The Burger Court repeatedly has reaffirmed 
M assiah, making clear that the rule applies to surreptitious 
interrogation methods. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 
387 (1977); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. -- (1985). In Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson,-- U. S.-- (1986), however, the Court did place 
an outer limit on the Massiah rule, requiring a defendant to 
'Just this term, the Court extended the rule in Edwards, holding that 
its protection applies once a suspect invokes his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel during his arraignment. Michigan v. Jackson,- U.S. -
(1986). 
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show that the police took some action, beyond merely listen-
ing, to elicit his incriminating remarks. 
The Warren Court also is well known for its Fourth 
Amendment decisions. One of the most famous of these, 
M app v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), held that the exclusion-
ary rule was applicable in state criminal trials. The Burger 
Court has continued stringently to enforce the rights of indi-
viduals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
But we have qualified some of the Warren Court's broad 
statements concerning the scope of the remedy for violation 
of Fourth Amendment rights. 
Most importantly perhaps, the Burger Court rejected lan-
guage in M app that suggested that use of illegally seized 
evidence was itself a Fourth Amendment violation. We ex-
plained that the exclusionary rule was a "judicially created 
means of effectuating" Fourth Amendment rights that rested 
"principally on the belief that exclusion would deter future 
unlawful police conduct." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 
482, 484 (1976). Based on that view of the exclusionary rule, 
the Burger Court significantly modified the rule when, in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), we adopted the 
so-called "good faith" exception. 
The Burger Court inherited criminal procedure decisions 
announcing broad principles protecting the rights of criminal 
defendants. 2 In reviewing lower court decisions applying 
1 Capital punishment jurisprudence was one area that was virtually un-
developed by the Warren Court, with that Court implicitly accepting the 
view that imposition of the death penalty was consistent with the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, in an opinion written for himself and three other Justices, 
Chief Justice Warren expressed the view that the death penalty could not 
"be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty" because the pen-
alty had been employed throughout our Nation's history and was still ac-
cepted by our society. Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 99 (1958). In 1972, 
however, the Burger Court took the significant step of deciding that capital 
punishment, as then implemented by the States, offended the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Furman v. · 
Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). When States responded to Furman by re-
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those principles, the Court was repeatedly called upon to 
define their terms and to clarify their scope. I think it 
is fair to say that the record of the Burger Court in this area 
reflects a higher sensitivity to the public interest in law en-
forcement than that reflected in some of the decisions of the 
Warren Court. But in my view, we have not diminished 
the constitutional protections afforded to those suspected of 
committing crime. 3 
enacting their death penalty statutes, the Court concluded that imposition 
of capital punishment for the crime of murder was not a per se violation of 
the Eighth Amendment and upheld those statutes that provided safe-
guards against arbitrary and capricious imposition of the penalty by guid-
ing sentencing discretion. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976); 
Proffit v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Loui-
siana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). In recent years, we have considered many 
challenges to imposition of the death penalty, seeking to ensure that the 
penalty is administered both consistently and fairly. E. g., Ake v. Okla-
homa,- U.S.- (1985); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 
U. S. 430 (1980). The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that imposition of 
the penalty is constitutional only if States scrupulously follow standards 
that protect against its arbitrary imposition. In two important capital 
punishment cases decided this term, we concluded that the Eighth Amend-
ment bars execution of a prisoner who is insane, Ford v. Wainwright,--
U. S. -- (1986), but upheld the States' practice of excluding from the 
jury that will decide guilt persons with scruples against the death penalty, 
Lockhart v. McCree,- U.S.- (1986). 
3 Habeas corpus jurisprudence is another area in which the Burger 
Court inherited a legacy of broad decisions favoring the rights of criminal 
defendants. The Burger Court clearly has narrowed some of those deci-
sions. Fairly read, the Burger Court's decisions represent an effort to ac-
commodate the States' interest in finality of criminal convictions, on which 
many important aspects of a rational criminal justice system are founded, 
with a prisoner's interest in relief from unjust incarceration. For exam-
ple, in Stone v. Powell, supra, we removed Fourth Amendment claims 
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes because of the costs imposed 
on the administration of criminal justice by application of the exclusionary 
rule on collateral review. We concluded that federal courts no longer 
should accept habeas jurisdiction over search and seizure claims unless the 
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Racial Discrimination 
I move now to racial discrimination decisions. The differ-
ences, if any, between the Warren and Burger Courts in this 
area resulted from the nature of the issues presented to the 
two Courts. The great legacy of Earl Warren's Court was 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Brown 
was followed by Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U. S. 430 (1968), which held that federal courts could, 
in appropriate cases, order affirmative action to achieve 
desegregated public schools. 
The Burger Court has not retreated from these decisions. 
Indeed, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion, 402 U. S. 1 (1971), a unanimous Burger Court ruled that 
federal district courts had remedial authority to order busing 
of school children where desegregation otherwise could not 
be achieved. Brown, Green, and Swann involved de jure 
segregation. Two years after Swann, we extended the prin-
ciples recognized in the de jure context to a case involving de 
facto segregation in the Denver, Colorado, school system. 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U. S. 
189 (1973). 
prisoner could show that the State had denied him a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the claim. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), the 
Burger Court disapproved the "sweeping language" used by the Warren 
Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), concerning the availability of 
federal habeas corpus to review a state prisoner's constitutional claim that 
the state courts had refused to consider on the merits because of noncom-
pliance with a contemporaneous objection rule. Sykes rejected the "delib-
erate bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia in favor of a test requiring the pris-
oner to demonstrate "cause and prejudice." This term, we were asked to 
reconsider Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), another broad 
Warren Court decision concerning habeas corpus. In Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son, -- U. S. -- (1986), a plurality of the Court agreed that a state 
prisoner is not entitled to successive federal habeas corpus review of his 
conviction unless he supplements his constitutional claim with a showing of 
factual innocence. 
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Perhaps the most difficult issues in this area arise in 
"affirmative action" or "reverse discrimination" cases. The 
Warren Court never confronted this issue. We squarely 
faced it for the first time in Regents of University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). There, the University's 
system for admission to its Medical School used a quota, 
reserving 16 of 100 seats for minority students. The parties 
conceded that the respondent Bakke, whose application for 
admission was rejected, had better grades and test scores 
than most of the minority students admitted. Since diver-
sity of experience and background, including race, was desir-
able in the educational setting, we concluded that a univer-
sity lawfully could consider race as a factor in its admissions 
system. But we disapproved fixed quotas based on race 
alone such as that used by the University in Bakke. 
Two years after Bakke, we considered an affirmative 
action program, expressly appro·ved by Congress, for choos-
ing contractors for Federal work projects. Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980). We upheld the plan, al-
though there was no Court for the appropriate standard to be 
used to assess the constitutionality of affirmative action. 
This past Term, we decided three difficult affirmative 
action cases. The first, Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education,-- U. S.-- (1986), was brought by nonminor-
ity teachers to challenge their school board's layoff system, 
under which nonminority teachers would be discharged while 
minority teachers with less seniority would be retained. 
The board sought to justify the system on the ground that it 
alleviated the effects of societal discrimination by providing 
role models for minority students. But there had been no 
finding of prior employment discrimination on the part of 
the school board. We therefore concluded that the racial 
classification embodied in the layoff provision violated equal 
protection. 
In two cases involving discrimination by local unions, 
we considered whether Title VII empowers federal courts to 
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order race-conscious relief that benefits persons who were 
not actual victims of discrimination. Sheet Metal Workers 
v. EEOC, -- U. S. -- (1986); Firefighters v. Cleveland, 
-- U. S. -- (1986). We concluded that such remedies, 
including hiring goals, may be appropriate where an em-
ployer or a labor union "has engaged in persistent or egre-
gious discrimination," or where "necessary to dissipate the 
lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." Sheet Metal 
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--. 
Despite the careful consideration given these cases, we 
have not yet agreed on a standard generally applicable in 
affirmative action cases. It is difficult to identify such a 
standard because these cases present a wide variety of cir-
cumstances, and raise issues under both the Equal Protection 
Clause and civil rights statutes. It is to be hoped that the 
day will soon come when race and ancestry are factors no 
longer taken into account in either private or governmental 
decision-making. 
I mention one additional race discrimination case decided 
this Term. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), the 
Warren Court effectively permitted prosecutors to use pe-
remptory challenges to strike prospective black jurors on ac-
count of their race. This term, in Batson v. Kentucky, --
U. S. -- (1986), we overruled Swain and held that such a 
use of peremptory challenges violates a black defendant's 
right to equal protection. Now, where the prosecutor's ac-
tion in striking blacks gives rise to an inference of discrimina-
tion, he must articulate a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for 
his use of peremptory challenges. In this case, the Burger 
Court went well beyond the Warren Court in expanding pro-
tections afforded to minorities in a criminal trial. 
Sex Discrimination 
Although it had few opportunities to consider the issue, 
the Warren Court seemed almost uninterested in sex dis-
crimination. For a century, the Supreme Court had refused 
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to overturn the line that States traditionally drew between 
the sexes, upholding statutes barring women from jury serv-
ice and from certain occupations. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 
U. S. 57 (1961), the Warren Court reaffirmed that States 
largely were free to exclude women from jury service. 
By contrast, the Burger Court repeatedly has removed 
barriers to equality among the sexes. While there have 
been many important decisions in this area, I mention only a 
few. 
The earliest was Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), that 
invalidated, under the Equal Protection Clause, an Idaho 
statute that gave a mandatory preference to male applicants 
for letters of adminstration of a decedent's estate. Although 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court was 
brief, it was recognized as a turning point in our equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), marked the 
beginning of the Burger · Court's efforts to decide what level 
of equal protection scrutiny should be applied to legislative 
classifications based on sex. A plurality argued that such 
classifications should be held inherently suspect and subject 
to strict judicial scrutiny. Four other Justices concurred in 
the judgment, declining to adopt that view of the applicable 
standard. But eight members of the Court agreed that the 
Equal Protection Clause required that married women in the 
armed services be provided fringe benefits identical to those 
given to married men. 
The Burger Court also effectively overruled the Warren 
Court's holding that a state lawfully could exclude women 
from jury service. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 
(1975), invalidated a Louisiana statute, similar to that upheld 
by the Warren Court in Hoyt v. Florida, that excluded all 
women from jury service except those who volunteered. 
Taylor was premised on the Sixth Amendment's requirement 
that juries in criminal trials be drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community, rather than on the Equal Pro-
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tection Clause. But language in Justice White's opinion for 
the Court rejected the notion that "all women should be ex-
empt from jury service based solely on their sex and [their] 
presumed role in the home." 419 U. S., at 535, n. 17. 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 
(1982), presented a reverse sex discrimination situation. In 
an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that a state-
supported professional nursing school could not lawfully 
exclude men even though seven other state universities were 
coeducational, with two of those seven schools providing the 
very curriculum that the respondent sought to pursue. This 
decision took the important step of clearly articulating a 
standard applicable to gender-based classifications. The 
Court held that a government attempting to support such a 
classification has the heavy "burden of showing an 'exceed-
ingly persuasive justification' for the classification," that is 
satisfied by showing that the "classification serves 'important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means 
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives."' 458 U. S., at 724 (citations omitted). 4 
Finally, in a case decided this term, we held that allega-
tions of "hostile environment" sexual harassment state an ac-
tionable sex discrimination claim under Title VII. M eritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson,-- U.S.-- (1986). The Court 
unanimously agreed on the result in this case. 
4 Another line of equal protection cases decided by the Warren Court 
involved challenges by individual voters to their States' reapportionment 
statutes. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U. S. 533 (1964). The Burger Court repeatedly has reaffirmed the vi-
tality of the principles announced there. E. g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 
412 U. S. 735 (1973). This term, the Court extended this line of decisions, 
squarely holding for the first time that a claim of partisan political gerry-
mandering is justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Davis v. 
Bandemer,- U. S.- (1986). But there was no Court for the stand-
ard that should be used to assess the constitutionality of a reapportionment 
law alleged to be an unlawful partisan gerrymander. 
( 
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Substantive Due Process 
The most controversial decision of the Burger Court is Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), that invalidated on substan-
tive due process grounds state laws that criminalized most 
abortions. Roe v. Wade and its progeny recognize a right of 
privacy, "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of 
personal liberty," that encompasses a woman's interest in 
obtaining an abortion. See, e. g., Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983); Planned 
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 
U. S. 476 (1983). This right is not absolute, but is subject to 
the States' interests in preserving maternal health or the life 
of a viable fetus. Because of their emphasis on the liberty 
and privacy interests of women, these decisions have been 
viewed as rejecting a type of sex discrimination. This term 
we reaffirmed Roe v. Wade in Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,-- U. S. -- (1986). 
A recent case tested the,limits of substantive due process. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick,-- U.S.-- (1986), the Court de-
clined to hold that substantive due process encompasses a 
right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Statutes similar 
to the Georgia law challenged in this case have been on 
the books for hundreds of years. These laws, now moribund 
and rarely enforced, still exist in about half of the states. 
The case may not be as significant as press reports suggest. 
The respondent had not been tried or convicted, and we had 
no occasion to consider possible defenses, such as one based 
on the Eighth Amendment, to an actual prosecution. 
First Amendment 
Although First Amendment partisans rarely seem satis-
fied, both the Warren and Burger Courts have been sensitive 
to the First Amendment rights that are fundamental to our 
democracy. Certainly, there has been no retreat by the 
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Burger Court from the stringent enforcement of these impor-
tant rights. 5 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, decided 
by the Warren Court in 1964, conferred a broad cloak of 
immunity upon the press. The Sullivan rule requires a pub-
lic official to prove that defamatory statements relating to 
his official conduct were made with "actual malice." The 
Warren Court extended this rule to public figures in Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), a libel 
suit brought against a media defendant by a private individ-
ual, the Burger Court defined the limits of the Sullivan rule. 
Gertz held that Sullivan does not apply in suits brought by 
private citizens seeking to recover actual damages for defam-
atory falsehoods. While some critics regarded Gertz as a 
5 Indeed, the Burger Court was the first to rule that the First Amend-
ment affords some protection to speech concerning a commercial transac-
tion. Prior to the 1970's, the Court declined to hold that the First Amend-
ment placed any restraint on governmental regulation of commercial 
speech. E. g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). In a series 
of decisions beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), the 
Burger Court held that commercial speech is not wholly outside the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia 
Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
433 U. S. 350 (1977). This term, in a case involving casino advertising, the 
Court again reaffirmed that speech concerning commercial transactions is 
entitled to First Amendment protection. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. 
v. Tourism Co.,-- U. S. -- (1986). But we concluded that a State's 
interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens could support a de-
cision to regulate commercial speech, as long as the restrictions advanced 
that interest and were no more extensive than necessary to serve that 
interest. 
The Burger Court also squarely rejected the view t_hat the First Amend-
ment protects only speech by individuals. Rather, we have repeatedly re-
affirmed the principle that speech by corporations and other associations is 
entitled to First Amendment protection. See First National Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public 
Service Comm'n ofN. Y ., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
v. Public Utilities Comm'n, -- U. S. -- (1986). 
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retreat from Sullivan, the decision reflects the Court's con-
tinuing effort to accommodate the States' interest in 
compensating for injury to reputation with First Amendment 
freedoms. 
Just this term, however, in a case involving a private plain-
tiff, the Court struck the balance in favor of the press. 
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, --_ U. S. 
-- (1986), we reversed the common law presumption that 
defamatory speech is false, and required a private plaintiff to 
prove falsity. 6 
The Burger Court also has decided a number of cases 
presenting issues under the "religion clauses" of the First 
Amendment. I believe it is fair to say that no prior Court 
has been more zealous to assure separation of church and 
state, and at the same time to protect the rights guaranteed 
by the Free Exercise Clause. 7 Of course, our decisions in 
• In another recent decision, we emphasized the important role of the 
federal courts in safeguarding the precious freedoms of speech and press 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Under Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485 (1984), the Court held that 
appellate judges must independently decide whether the evidence in the 
record supports a trial court's finding of malice. We reaffirmed in Bose 
that "[t]he requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law." 466 
U. S., at 510. 
1 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), a decision written by Chief 
Justice Burger during the early years of the Burger Court, established the 
"purpose, effect, and entanglement" test that remains the governing stand-
ard under the Establishment Clause. During the 1984 term, the Court ap-
plied that standard in three cases presenting challenges under the Estab-
lishment Clause. See Wallace v. Jaffree, -- U. S. -- (1985); Grand 
Rapids School District v. Ball,-- U. S. -- (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 
-- U. S. -- (1985). Our decisions under the Free Exercise Clause 
have reaffirmed the principle that the Clause absolutely prohibits govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs and that it substantially protects law-
ful conduct founded on religious belief. Where the government limits reli-
gious liberty, it must demonstrate that the limitation "'is essential to 
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.'" Bob Jones University 
v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 603 (1983) (quoting United States v. Lee, 
. '
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this area reflect the tensions inevitably created by the some-
times conflicting values embodied in the religion clauses. 
Summary 
The Burger Court decided well over 2,000 cases. The 
Warren Court, over 15 years, decided several hundred fewer 
cases. I cite these numbers to emphasize the high degree of 
selectivity in my discussion this afternoon. Depending upon 
the cases one chooses, and one's purpose or bias, either of 
these courts can be cast in liberal or conservative, favorable 
or unfavorable lights. 
But some points seem indisputable. Perhaps to the disap-
pointment of the Presidents who nominated members of the 
Burger Court, there has been no "counter-revolution" by that 
Court. None of the landmark decisions of the Warren Court 
was overruled, and some were extended. 
It has been fashionable for critics to say that the Burger 
Court "lacked a sense of direction," appeared to "drift," or 
lacked a coherent "policy." 8 To lawyers, and certainly to 
Article III judges, these observations should make little 
sense. The great strength of the Supreme Court is that we 
have no "policy" or purpose other than "faithfully and impar-
tially'' to discharge our duties "agreeably to the Constitution 
and laws of the United States."9 This is our sworn duty. 
As a New York Times editorial put it, "The ultimate glory of 
this unique institution is that each member [appointed for 
life] is master only of himself." New York Times, June 18, 
1986. 
It is well to remember that the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights are expressed in general terms: the First, Fourth, 
455 U. S. 252, 257-258 (1982)). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 
(1972). 
8 This misconception of the role of the Supreme Court was strikingly 
illustrated by a widely circulated news story. The Court was criticized 
for giving "mixed signals" rather than providing "one guided ideology." 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 13, 1986. 
'28 U. S. C. §453 (oath taken by federal Justices and judges) . 
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Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments all are open to, and 
indeed require, interpretation. Inevitably and properly, 
reasonable minds-trained in the same law schools-often 
differ in interpreting these important provisions. Yet, the 
long-term stability of our legal system is based on the doc-
trine of stare decisis. Commentators who expect radical 
changes because of personnel changes on the Court seem to 
overlook our fidelity to this doctrine. 
If I may speak personally, I knew most of the Justices 
on the Warren Court, and of course I am close to those on 
the Burger Court with whom I serve. I have great respect 
and admiration for the legal ability, devotion to duty, and in-
tegrity of each of them. 
Although at age 64 I went on the Court with some reluc-
tance, I am honored to serve on it. Under our remarkable 
constitutional system, the Court has well discharged its 
responsibility to safeguard the liberties of our people. 
August 12, 1986 LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
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• • • voted initially to overturn statute 
ll. 
.. 
Powell Changed te in Sodomy Case 
Different Outcome Seen Likl}lf If Homosexual Had Been Prosecuted 
By AI Kamen 
Wuhinaton Post Staff Writer 
1.1· ••• ~ ~'-' ]! 
ur justices, led by Harry A. 
ckmun, voted to say that a con-
titutional right to privacy protects 
homosexuals and that the state 
would have to show important rea-
sons to outlaw sodomy among con-
senting adults. 
Though Powell did not agree 
with the reasoning, he voiced suf-
ficient distaste for the antisodomy 
law that he agreed to provide the 
udal fifth vote for an overall de-
ision striking the Georgia statute. 
Four other justices, led by Byron 
R. White, said the Constitution does 
not grant homosexuals a right to 
such conduct, even in their homes . 
Powell's vote was tentative. All 
votes in conference are preliminary 
and can be changed at any time up 
to the formal announcement of the 
decision by the court. 
With a fifth vote, Blackmun could 
have written a majority opinion that 
would have had the effect of over-
turning antisodomy laws in 24 
states and the District of Colum-
bia. 
Within several days of the con-
ference, however, Powell sent a 
brief memo to his fellow justices 
saying that he was switching his 
vote and would, given the "posture" 
See POWELL, AS, CoL 4 
t 
Powell Cha:riged Vote in Sodoiny·-case · 
___ PO_WB_L_L,_Pro_a_A_l_~.......,.\ court, Atlanta prosecutors did not 'that~ states had prohibited it until 
press charges against Hardwick, 1961. Chief justice Warren E. 
of this case, join White and the oth- who had been arrested after being Bur..ser )Uld justices William H. 
ers to uphold the Georgia law. ·· c;aught in his bedroom in a se~ act . . Relinquist aiid'SaAdra Day O'Con-
Sources were unable to pinpoint with another man. nor also joined White, 
why Powell changed his mind. They '' ... The sources said Powell would Blackmun, joined by justices Wit-
said a critical factor was that Mi- TOte to repeal antisodomy laws if he 1iam J, Brennan.Jr,, Thurgood Mar-
chael Hardwick, a gay Atlanta bar- were a legislator. There have been shall and john Paul Stevens, ac-
.tender, had not been· prosecuted. JR"oscriptions against sodoni~ (r~ . cused ~e ~rity of an 4obsessive 
;lnstead, Hardwick, through -a civil the first days of recorded history. · focus .QD hom~xual- ~tivity," giv-
lawsuit, was asking the court to de- The court virtually wbuld have to en that the Georgia sodomy law 
clare-the law unconstitutional. . cast these aside under Blackmun's covered heterosexual as well as ho-
Powell stayed with White, de- theory, Powell felt. mosexcaal acts. • 
spite a strident dissent circulated In addi~on, Powell ~ long had "The court's cramped teading of 
by a furious Blackmun·, and 'joined trouble With the notion that the the issue before it makes for a short 
the majority opinion issued June 30. court _could substitute its views ~f opinion," Blackmun said, "'but it 
Details of Powell's switch, pro- moraltty for those of elected offt- does little to make for a persuasive 
vided by -informed sources, offer an cials. He wa~ reluctant to ~av~ the one." 
unusual glimpse of the workings of court recogmze _more specta~ n~hts . "It is revolting," he said, "to have 
the Supreme Court. Though ather not spelled ou~ m the Constttutton, no better reason for a rule of law 
' accounts of justices' changing their the sourc;s satd_. than that so it was laid down at the 
minds in key cases have been dis- Powells sw~tch cam~ ~f?re time of Henry IV. It is still more re-
closed in the past, such information Blackmun had ~c~ated his op~on volting if the grounds upon which it 
1 rarely reaches the public. to ~he other JUStl~s for revte~. was laid down have vanished long 
When the court announced its · ' Whtte also ~d not ctrcul~ted ~ dis- since, and the rule simply persists 
ruling in the Georgia case, Powell ·sent. Pow_ell, .801.t~c~s satd, sunply from blind imitation of the past." 
. d . h . . .-£hanged his nund. . Th rulin ked f' tssue a one-paragrap concur{lng .. 1 . , p 11 'd . h' e g provo a trestorm 
?Pinion. explaining why he_ was join- con~r~~;~~;lmoiwfnn:~ce~ ~~ of criticism. eivil ri~hts groups said 
mg Wh1te. He strongly hmted that June 301 "a prison sentence for such the court. was treating h~sexu~l~ 
he w?uld not vote t~ uphold such conduct-certainly a sentence of much as 1t treated bla~ks ~them 
laws m future ca~s .. if l~wyers . ar~ lteng duration •. ·' for-a single pri- famou~ Dred Scott ruling m 1857, 
gued that excesstve p~son terms vate consensual act ·of sodomy . . . ~~~n 1t , decl~red blacks w_ere. no~ 
for . h_om?Sexual a~s . ~1olated _the would .create a '.serious Eighth c1tizen~ entitled to constltutiona\ 
const1tuttonal proh1~rt1on agamst Amendment issije." , . protections. . . 
cruel and unusual purushment. . But Hardwick -bas not been The Bowers v. ll_a!dw.ck rulm~ 
Powell felt that a homqsexual tried " Powell said "nwch less con- also could mark a cnt1cal departure 
might be able to argue that his or victed and sente~ced. Moreover from the court's 30-year willing,-
h~r sexual orientati~n was part_ of (Hardwick) has not raised th~ n~ss to ~~em . new constitutional 
h1s or her natural bemg, companng ' Eighth Amendment ·issue" in the nghts wtthm the "penumbras" of 
it to the way drug addicts can argue lower courts. . the broad language of the Consti-
tbat their addiction is beyond their Powell said he was joining White tution and to declare certain mat-
control. Thus, in Powell's view, if because "' cannot say that conduct ters-such as contraception or 
the state imposed criminal sane~ condemned for hundreds of years abortion-virtually off-limits to 
tions, especially the 20-year jail has now become a fundamental state regulation. 
sentence -Georgia set ~or a single right." · The case, ~owever, may not be 
act of s~my, that would violate White's brief opinion said Hard- over. Hardwtck, who spent 12 
the cruel and ilnusua• punishment wick was asking the court to say the hours locked up after his arrest and 
ban in the Eighth Amendment.. Constitution protected private, con- who claimed harassment because of 
Powell, sources said, dislikes an- sensual homosexual conduct. his homosexuality, may yet be given 
tisodomy laws, feeling that they are "This we are quite unwilling to a chance to argue in the lower 
useless, never enforced and. unen- dQ," White said, noting the "ancient courts that his rights Uflder the 
forceable. In the case bef~re the roots" of bans against sodomy and Eight Amendment were violated. 
